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ABSTRACT: 
Defending Robert Rosen’s claim that in every confrontation between physics and biology it is physics 
that has always had to give ground, it is shown that many of the most important advances in mathematics 
and physics over the last two centuries have followed from Schelling’s demand for a new physics that 
could make the emergence of life intelligible. Consequently, while reductionism prevails in biology, 
many biophysicists are resolutely anti-reductionist. This history is used to identify and defend a 
fragmented but progressive tradition of anti-reductionist biomathematics. It is shown that the 
mathematico-physico-chemico morphology research program, the biosemiotics movement, and the 
relational biology of Rosen, although they have developed independently of each other, are built on and 
advance this anti-reductionist tradition of thought. It is suggested that understanding this history and its 
relationship to the broader history of post-Newtonian science could provide guidance for and justify both 
the integration of these strands and radically new work in post-reductionist biomathematics.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Theoretical biologists are intensifying their efforts to overcome reductionism in order to 
comprehend the reality of life. While mechanistic accounts of life were vigorously defended at the 
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beginning of the Twentieth Century (Loeb, 1912), reductionism reached its zenith in the third quarter of 
the Twentieth Century with the synthetic theory of evolution embracing molecular biology, cybernetics 
and information theory. Evolution was equated with changes in populations of genes, identified with 
DNA, encoding information on how to produce survival machines to reproduce themselves. Biology was 
reduced to chemistry, which it was assumed would be explained by physics. Those reacting against this 
reductionism have revived earlier and established new anti-reductionist traditions of thought. The notions 
of system, complexity and semiotics are central to their work.  
However, the concepts developed to overcome reductionism have been appropriated by 
reductionists to develop a more vigorous form of reductionism. Paul Weiss’s and von Bertalanffy’s notion 
of system was early on turned against their whole project of overcoming mechanistic thought, although 
those involved in doing this appear not to have understood what they were doing (von Bertalanffy 1968, 
25; O’Malley and Dupré 2005; Trewavas 2006). The notion of complexity, central to anti-reductionist 
thinking, has fared no better. It is clear from Warren Weaver’s lecture given in 1947 in which the 
challenge of explaining complex organized systems was first posed, that Weaver saw this as a challenge 
for reductionist science, not a challenge to overcome reductionism (Weaver 1948). Most complexity 
theorists have focused on and studied the order generated by the interaction between very large numbers 
of entities. This, when taken by itself, has been recognized by some as a further triumph of reductionism. 
Nonlinear dynamical systems are capable of representing the world as unpredictable and capable of 
generating macroscopic patterns; but this is at the level of appearance. The dynamics are deterministic 
effects of components and their interactions and would appear to rule out anything but the appearance of 
emergence. This is true also of the concepts used in relation to emergent phenomena. As Per Bak, a 
distinguished member of the Santa Fe Institute pointed out in 1994: ‘[W]hat is adaptability of a complex 
system? Since “purpose” and “rationality,” and thus “learning” and “adaptability” do not really exist in 
deterministic dynamical system, the question should really be: which are the features of complex systems 
that an outside observer might interpret as adaptability?’ (Bak, 1994, p.492; Gare, 2000). While 
biosemiotics is still resolutely anti-reductionist, efforts have been made to provide a mechanistic 
explanation of codes and to account for semiosis through informatics based on the purely mechanistic 
notion of information deriving from Claude Shannon and Weaver. Living organisms, including humans, 
have been reconceived as information processing cyborgs (Brier, 2008, 22 and 35ff.). 
While the resultant augmented reductionism has satisfied most researchers, others have 
vigorously opposed this conception of life. They had good reasons for this. Reductionism implies that 
science itself and the quest to comprehend nature and life are impossible. Despite efforts of reductionists 
to naturalize epistemology, understood reductionistically, cyborgs cannot comprehend anything. 
Reductionism is incoherent. For an account of the more specific deficiencies and manifest failures of the 
reductionist assumption, see for example Kauffman (2009). The bias towards reductionism has led anti-
reductionists to investigate deeper assumptions that have continually channeled working scientists back to 
and reinforced their reductionism, despite its radical incoherence and its pernicious influence on the 
broader culture (where it has underlain a revived Social Darwinism and a form of managerialism that 
exacerbates and even engenders so many problems that they now have a name: ‘wicked problems’ (Rittel 
and Weber, 1973). We are scarcely advanced from the crisis in science and civilization described by René 
Thom in 1975 where science based technology had engendered a global ecological crisis while beneath 
triumphant proclamations celebrating scientific progress, there was a ‘manifest stagnation of scientific 
thought vis-à-vis the central problems affecting our knowledge of reality.’ The underlying reason for this 
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stagnation, Thom argued, was that ‘science [had sunk] into a futile hope of exhaustively describing 
reality, while forbidding itself to “understand” it’ (Aubin, 2004, 95).   
Confronting the failure to overcome this situation, anti-reductionists have re-examined the 
Seventeenth Century Cartesian and Newtonian reconception of the very idea of inquiry and explanation 
and the influence of this on the subsequent history of science, a reconception that now so permeates 
culture that it is usually assumed without question that only reductionist explanations have any scientific 
validity. Exemplifying this interrogation of embedded assumptions, Stuart Kauffman observed: 
We have lived with a world view dominated by reductionism. Yet recently, S. Hawking has 
written an article entitled “Gödel and the End of Physics.” His observations raise the possibility 
that we should question our foundations. Core to this is reductionism itself. In turn reductionism 
finds its roots in Aristotle’s model of scientific explanation as deductive inference. All men are 
mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is mortal. With Newton’s laws in differential form, 
reductionism snaps into place, for given initial and boundary conditions, integration of those 
equations is exactly deduction. Aristotle’s ‘efficient cause’ becomes mathematized as deduction 
(Kauffman, 2009, 1.). 
In a more recent paper, ‘Answering Descartes: Beyond Turing’, Kauffman again pointed to and 
questioned the pervasive reductionist assumptions which he claimed are now crippling efforts to 
characterize the mind. He noted that ‘Two lines of thought, one stemming from Turing himself, the other 
from none other than Bertrand Russell, have led to the dominant view that the human mind arises as some 
kind of vast network of logical gates, or classical physics “consciousness neurons”’ (Kauffman 2012, 1). 
On this view, the mind-brain system is nothing but ‘a network of classical physics neurons, with 
continuous variables, and continuous time, interacting in classical physics causal ways via action 
potentials, vast networks with classical physics inputs and outputs’ (Kauffman 2012, 3).  
However, a more thoroughgoing examination of reductionist assumptions bequeathed by the 
Seventeenth Century scientific revolution had already been undertaken by the mathematician and 
theoretical biologist, Robert Rosen. Rosen observed:  
[T]he central concept of Newtonian mechanics, from which all others flow as corollaries or 
collaterals, is the concept of state, and with it, the effective introduction of recursion as the basic 
underpinning of science itself. … Thus, in my view, the Principia ultimately mandated thereby 
the most profound changes in the concept of Natural Law itself; in some ways a sharpening but in 
deeper ways, by imposing the most severe restrictions and limitations upon it (Rosen 1991, 89f.)  
The concept of an atom did not emerge from any analysis offered by Newton; rather, he simply 
presupposed particles without structure and devoted himself entirely to synthesis, asking what behaviour 
can be manifested by such particles, individually or collectively. The formalism based on this procedure 
assumes that that almost everything of importance is unentailed. There is no place for final causes. Why? 
questions are ruled out. The only entailment is a recursive rule governing state succession. Causation is 
collapsed down to what can be encoded in a state transition sequence, as this is all the Newtonian 
language allows to be decoded back into causal language. Further strictures follow from the assumption 
that the universe is composed of structureless particles, that every system has a largest model from which 
every other model can be effectively abstracted by purely formal means, and ‘this largest model is of an 
essentially syntactic nature, in that structureless, unanalyzable elements (the particles) are pushed around 
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by mandated rules of entailment that are themselves beyond the reach of entailment’ (Rosen 1991, 103).1 
On the basis of this analysis of Newtonian science, Rosen defined a natural system as mechanical if it has 
a largest model, consisting of a set of states, and a recursion rule entailing subsequent states from the 
present states, and every other state of it can be deduced from the largest one by formal means. On this 
basis, Rosen argued that the idea that nature is governed by mathematical laws as conceived by Newton 
‘boils down to the assertion that every natural system is a mechanism’ (Rosen 1991, 103).2 
Reductionism prevails not only because objective, scientific knowledge has come to be identified 
by most people with knowledge based on these Newtonian assumptions, but because these assumptions 
are entrenched in the way all other facets of culture are interpreted and are embodied in modern 
technology. Hilbert’s formalism in mathematics, for instance, still widely assumed despite having been 
refuted by Gödel, eliminates reference to an extra symbolic reality and reduces mathematics to the 
manipulation of symbols. As Rosen wrote of the implications of this: ‘Once inside such a universe … we 
cannot get out again, because all the original external referents have presumably been pulled inside with 
us. The thesis in effect assures us that we never need to get outside again, that all referents have indeed 
been internalised in a purely syntactical form’ (Rosen, 1999, 77). It appears that people in Western culture 
(which dominates the world) are now enclosed in worlds constructed on the assumptions of classical 
physics that channel how they live, perceive and think, blinkering them to the reality of anything that 
cannot be comprehended from this physically embodied perspective. Illustrating this, in a short piece on 
‘Cells as Computation’ published in Nature, the authors argued that current computer science now can 
provide the abstractions required for a scientific understanding of life (Regev and Shapiro, 2002). That is, 
the abstractions, tools and methods used to study computer systems that are built on and embody 
Newtonian assumptions (Rosen, 1996, 211; MacLennan, 2004; Simeonov, 2011) are now being claimed 
to provide the basis for integrating all our knowledge of biomolecular systems. Acceptance of this 
argument would completely entrench current computer science with its reductionist, Newtonian 
assumptions as the measure of science and so would rule out challenges to these assumptions, only 
allowing those aspects of life that could be comprehended through these digital computers to be 
acknowledged as actual and of any scientific importance. 
A number of strategies have been adopted in the quest to expose, put in question and overcome 
these assumptions. Kauffman has taken a not uncommon path and invoked quantum theory where deeply 
held assumptions have been shown to be untenable. While this opens new avenues for reconceptualizing 
the nature of explanation and of physical existence itself which are more promising for comprehending 
rather than explaining away life, an alternative path is to consider what is involved in being alive, 
conceptualizing this, and then developing forms of mathematics and explanations appropriate to this. This 
path has been taken by Kauffman also, but it was embraced more resolutely by Rosen and those inspired 
by him. These strategies are not mutually exclusive as they can lead to the same or similar results with the 
development of quantum theory and the study of life illuminating each other, and as I will argue below, 
originated in the same anti-mechanist tradition of thought.3 However, here it is the second path that I will 
                                                     
1 It is important to note that field theory, which Rosen does not discuss, broke with this way of thinking in the 
Nineteenth Century. 
2 It is also important to note that Newton himself had a more complex understanding of his mechanics than his 
‘Newtonian’ followers and was in fact closer to the critics of Newtonianism than the Newtonians (McMullin, 1978). 
3 The biophysicist Marco Bischof has provided the history of the relationship between biology and post-mechanistic 
physics (Bischof, 2003). Mae-Wan Ho has attempted to integrate advances in post-mechanistic physics with the 
work of the theoretical biologists (Ho, 2008).  
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focus upon, although I will suggest that in breaking down entrenched assumptions and freeing physics 
from mechanistic metaphysics, developments in theoretical physics are relevant to biology.  
There are good reasons for taking the second approach very seriously. As Rosen pointed out in a 
Festschrift for the theoretical physicist David Bohm: ‘In every confrontation between universal physics 
and special biology, it is physics which has always had to give ground’ (Rosen 1987, p.315). Rosen’s 
work was distinguished by a determination to develop mathematical models adequate to life as it appears 
to us, rather than imposing a research program coming from the physical sciences onto biology. While 
steadily gaining recognition, his work was unfinished. He produced a trilogy, the first book of which, 
Fundamentals of Measurement and Representation of Natural Systems, grappled with the problem of 
measurement and representation, the second, Anticipatory Systems, with anticipatory systems, and the 
third, titled Life Itself, with epistemological issues raised by the effort to comprehend life (Rosen, 1978; 
1991; 2012). The projected fourth work was supposed to deal with ontology, His Essays on Life Itself 
(Louie 2009, p.xiii; Rosen, 1999), published posthumously, was not this volume.  
Rosen was not alone in his determination to develop a mathematics and ontology adequate to the 
reality of life. His own work was inspired by the relational biology of Nicolas Rashevsky and the systems 
theory of Ludwig von Bertalanffy (Rosen, 2006). Rashevsky, the founder of Mathematical Biophysics, 
developed a new approach to life by focusing on the principle which governs organization of living 
organisms, expressing their biological unity, independently of its material instantiation (Rosen, 1991, 
117ff.). Von Bertalanffy’s systems theory was developed to replace reductionist materialism and provide 
the foundation for a holistic conception of life. Both were concerned to apply mathematics to biology. 
Biologists associated with the theoretical biology movement, most importantly C.H. Waddington, were 
influenced by Alfred North Whitehead, who while being primarily concerned with mathematics, 
developed an anti-reductionist metaphysics based on an ontology of events and organisms. Although 
Waddington saw his own mathematical abilities as limited, he also was committed to applying 
mathematics to biology, and René Thom and Brian Goodwin subsequently attempted to develop new 
forms of mathematics to advance Waddington’s ideas. More recently, biosemioticians such as Thomas 
Sebeok, Jesper Hoffmeyer and Kalevi Kull, embracing the work of Jacob von Uexküll, C.S. Peirce and 
Gregory Bateson, have also taken the experience of life as their reference point for developing their 
theories of life, challenging physics in the process. While being more skeptical of the potential of 
mathematics in this (Hoffmeyer, 1996, 38), some biosemioticians have embraced the work of H.H. Pattee 
(Salthe, 1993), and in one case, the work of Nils Baas, to advance their ideas (Baas and Emmeche 1996). 
While all this work can be regarded as complementary and efforts are being made to integrate these 
different research programs, along with a number of other allied or parallel developments in theoretical 
biology (Bischof, 2003; Letelier et.al., 2011), this is research in progress rather than a completed 
program.  
As noted, Rosen did not produce his projected fourth volume. His student, A.H. Louie has 
advanced Rosen’s work, but even his book More Than Life Itself makes no claims to providing the 
ontology promised by Rosen (Louie 2009, xiv). Nor is this supplied by another major work influenced by 
Rosen, Memory Evolutive Systems: Hierarchy, Emergence, Cognition by Andrée Ehresmann and J-P. 
Vanbremeersch (2007), although a closely allied researcher, George Kampis, has pointed out the 
ontological implications of similar ideas (Kampis 1991, ch.9). To fully appreciate and further advance 
Rosen’s work in theoretical biology not only as the basis for integrating work in post-reductionist 
biology, as an effective challenge to the pre-eminence of physics, and for providing the ontology that 
Rosen believed is required for this and thereby to advance physics as well as biology, it is necessary to 
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situate this work in a much longer time perspective. It is argued here that it is necessary to examine and 
appreciate the efforts to overcome Newtonian physics and their achievements from the end of the 
Eighteenth Century, particularly those of F.W.J. Schelling and those he influenced. What we see when we 
adopt this longer time perspective is that there is a relatively coherent tradition characterized by intense 
efforts to empirically investigate the reality of life in all its dimensions generating equally intense efforts 
to develop new mathematical approaches adequate to the reality of life. It is a tradition that not only has 
made great progress, but in doing so has revolutionized not only biology but mathematics and physics, 
and Rosen’s work when it is understood in the context of this tradition both provides the perspective 
required to reintegrate it, and points to what kind of work is now required to further advance it.  
 
2. Schelling’ Challenge to Newtonian Physics and its Influence 
 
The case for taking biology as the reference point for science and reforming physics on this basis 
was first made by Schelling. While for a long time the contribution of Schelling to subsequent science 
was dismissed (Lenoir, 1982), this view has since been discredited, in the case of biology through the 
work of Robert Richards, although it still persists (Richards, 2002; Gare, 2011, 67).4 However, even when 
the importance of Schelling’s work is appreciated, the revolutionary implications of privileging biology 
over Newtonian physics remain under-appreciated.  
Schelling’s point of departure was first and foremost the work of Kant, most importantly, Kant’s 
work on biology in the Critique of Judgment.5 The Critique of Pure Reason was important for providing a 
notion of knowledge through construction and for clarifying the concepts of Newtonian physics that had 
to be overcome in order to provide a stronger defence of Kant’s work on biology. In this earlier work 
Kant had characterized mathematical knowledge as synthetic a priori rather than analytic or empirical, 
arguing that we only really know what we ourselves have made or constructed, and he revealed the deep 
assumptions underlying Newtonian science that allowed the world to be understood through the 
mathematics of his day. In doing so, he highlighted how the physics developed on the basis of these 
assumptions was inconsistent with ethics and the possibility of genuine aesthetic taste, but also with the 
appreciation of natural purposes; that is, with the reality of life. In the Critique of Judgment Kant 
characterized natural purpose and clarified the difference between living organisms and mechanisms. A 
‘natural purpose’, as an organized being ‘must relate to itself in such a way that it is both cause and effect 
of itself’, Kant claimed (Kant 1987, §65, 251). There are two requirements for this. ‘First, the possibility 
of its parts (as concerns both their existence and their form) must depend on their relation to the whole. … 
A second requirement … is that the parts of the thing combine into the unity of a whole because they are 
reciprocally cause and effect of their form’ (Kant 1987, §65, 252). Since Kant had argued that intuitive 
knowledge gained through construction is confined to geometry and arithmetic and that the forms of 
intuition and the categories of the understanding underpinning Newtonian physics are constitutive of all 
experience, he held that the notion of natural purpose could be taken only as a regulative principle for the 
study of living organisms, not a constitutive principle. It is always possible that in the future the 
                                                     
4 Schelling is represented by Lenoir as a vitalist (Lenoir, 1989, 124), despite Schelling’s opposition to the notion of 
life-force (Schelling, 1988, 37), and then Karl Ernst von Baer and other scientists who embraced Schelling’s 
research program, including his dynamic evolutionism (Richards, 2002, 312), are represented as breaking away from 
Schelling’s influence.Apart from this, Lenoir does show that through an emphasis of Darwin ‘we have overlooked a 
significant, valid alternative approach to biological phenomena during the early nineteenth century (Lenoir, 1989, 
3). 
5 Schelling was also strongly influenced by Fichte, Goethe and Spinoza, among others. On this, see Gare (2011). 
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appearance of purpose will be explained mechanistically, and only through mechanism, Kant averred, can 
we really gain insight into the nature of things (Kant, 1987, §78, 295).  
Schelling rejected Kant’s demarcation or ‘negative instruction’ of what could be known through 
construction and argued that the whole of nature could be comprehended through intellectual intuition as 
nature’s self-construction, with the constructive activity of the human subject being a part of this self-
construction (Schelling, 1978, §4, 13; 1802, 125-151). He also rejected Kant’s claim that the forms of 
intuition and the categories of the understanding could be established through a transcendental deduction 
as true for all time as the conditions for knowledge. Naturalizing the transcendental, he argued that it is 
necessary to construe nature so as to make intelligible both its comprehensibility, and the evolution within 
nature and development through history of human consciousness which could comprehend it (Gare, 2011, 
43). There are not absolute foundations for knowledge, and no knowledge claim can be taken as final; 
instead, claims to knowledge are circular, with his natural philosophy justifying belief in the reality and 
capacity of consciousness to know the world, and his work on idealism, justified by this conception of 
consciousness, showing how consciousness develops to be able to comprehend the world and itself, 
thereby justifying this natural philosophy. Instead of accepting Kant’s defence of the concepts of existing 
physics, Schelling argued that it is necessary to construct more adequate concepts to comprehend the 
physical world so as to make intelligible the emergence of life and then human consciousness. To achieve 
this, he rejected the role accorded to self-organization by Kant (in the Critique of Judgment) as just a 
marginal feature of the universe acknowledged as a regulative principle necessary for the study of natural 
purposes. Schelling saw the whole of nature as a self-organizing process that has generated force, 
extension, apparently inert matter (in which stability is achieved through a balance of opposing forces), 
space and time and living organisms. Nature is the activity of opposing forces of attraction and repulsion 
generating one form after another. Inverting Kant’s characterization of causation, Schelling argued that 
mechanical cause-effect relations are abstractions from the reciprocal causation of self-organizing 
processes (Schelling, 1978, 110ff.). Matter is itself a self-organizing process. While ‘matter’ emerges 
through a static balance of opposing forces, living organisms were characterized by Schelling as 
responding to changes in their environments to maintain their internal equilibrium by forming and 
reforming themselves (anticipating Claude Bernard, the notion of homeostasis, and the more recent work 
of Turner, 2007), a process in which they resist the dynamics of the rest of nature and impose their own 
organization, constituting their environments as their worlds and reacting to these accordingly 
(anticipating Jacob von Uexküll’s central idea). Animal and human consciousness evolved through this 
process (Schelling, 2004, 193ff.; Gare, 2011). For Schelling, ‘Speculative Physics’ is required to produce 
the concepts necessary to comprehend the self-constructive activity by which nature has evolved 
(Schelling, 2004, 193ff.). Developing the methodology of construction as the basis for all knowledge, of 
nature, humanity and all products of humanity, Schelling suggested the possibility of developing new 
forms of mathematics to achieve this comprehension. 
There are a number of features of Schelling’s conception of nature and of what constitutes 
knowledge of it that were important for the future of science. He argued that we are part of nature, so our 
comprehension of nature is simultaneously nature comprehending itself through us and our 
comprehension of ourselves as products of nature. It is essentially nature reflecting on itself and coming 
to know itself from the inside as a process of its and our self-formation. This requires of us that we 
distinguish ourselves as subjects from the rest of nature to achieve such knowledge, postulating what 
Schelling argued is an illusionary and misleading duality between ourselves as subjects and the world. 
However, Schelling argued, such knowledge presupposes living nature and only emerges from it, and we 
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can know nature through reflection because we are part of, have emerged from, and are practically 
engaged within it. Initially, concepts are not developed through reflection but through action and then 
brought to full consciousness and refined through reflection. This includes mathematical concepts, 
although their development requires an intellectual reconstruction.  
Re-examining the history of science it has become evident that many of the most important 
developments in the physical sciences since Schelling’s time have been generated by physicists and 
mathematicians inspired directly or indirectly by Schelling’s work, or where there is no influence, amount 
to a rediscovery of insights already contained in germinal form in the work of Schelling or those inspired 
by him. To begin with, there are the obvious influences (Esposito, 1977). Schelling’s characterization of 
being as productive activity led scientists who had initially been influenced by Schelling but then turned 
their backs on him, most notably Hermann von Helmoltz, to develop the notion of conservation of ‘force’, 
later characterized as ‘energy’, a core notion of thermodynamics (Kuhn, 1977). His reformulation of 
dynamism according to which matter is generated by forces guided Oersted’s discovery of 
electromagnetism which in turn influenced the development of field theory by Michael Faraday, whose 
ideas Schelling enthusiastically embraced (Williams, 1980, 48ff.).6 Schelling was centrally engaged with 
the birth of modern chemistry as a science, which had been dismissed by Kant as lacking the systematic 
unity required for this status, and Schelling’s explanation of diverse chemicals being the products of 
opposing forces foreshadowed the development of the concept of valence (Schelling, 1988, 221). 
Schelling’s notion of self-organizing entities eventually led to the development of systems theory 
(Heuser-Kessler, 1986). While hierarchy theory (particularly as developed by Howard Pattee and those he 
influenced, according to which new levels of emergence involve new levels of constraint) was not directly 
inspired by Schelling (although there may have been an indirect influence through the work of Michael 
Polanyi), Schelling’s notion of emergence through limiting of activity clearly anticipates this idea (1985, 
144; 1993, ch.2). Closely similar is the recent insight by Kauffman that an evolutionary niche should be 
seen as an ‘enabling constraint’ (2009). And Schelling’s evolutionary cosmology and his arguments for 
the evolution of terrestrial life, developed before Lamarck, influenced the development of later 
evolutionary theories (Richards, 2002). However, it is the less obvious influences, particularly associated 
with the quest to characterize knowledge in mathematics and of nature as an intellectual intuition of the 
process of construction, showing how new levels in nature emerge through evolution, that is more 
significant (Heuser-Kessler, 1992). These influences are most clearly evident in his immediate followers, 
but their work and the Schellingian tradition of Naturphilosophie inspired some of the most important 
developments in mathematics and mathematical physics in the nineteenth century. 
One of the most important figures in the development of Schelling’s research program to develop 
a mathematics through which nature could be known as constructive activity was Christian Samuel Weiss 
(Heuser, 2011). Embracing Schelling’s holistic understanding of nature from which matter emerges 
through a constructive process, in 1804 Weiss speculated on the ultimate beginning of the universe, the 
formation of crystals and the formation of life. Following Schelling, he suggested that matter originated 
with a ‘creatio ex zero’ through which opposing quantities emerged and existed through their separation, 
but which if brought into contact would annihilate each other and become zero again. That is, he 
postulated the existence of the equivalent of anti-matter, with matter and anti-matter being generated by a 
symmetry breaking process. Extension, he argued, is generated by difference as an infinite manifold 
                                                     
6 Initially, Faraday was the assistant of Humphry Davy who was also influenced by Schelling through Coleridge, 
and with Faraday, combined Schelling’s concept of matter as the product of opposing forces with Roger Joseph 
Boscovich’s concept of the atom defined by forces of attraction and repulsion. 
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which has to be grasped as a continuous multiplicity. He developed on this basis a mathematical theory of 
crystal formation as a part of the self-formation of nature. Introducing the concept of axis, Weiss was able 
to describe the seven crystal forms. This was his main contribution to science. However, Weiss saw this 
account of the self-formation of crystals as a starting point for investigating the self-formation of living 
matter. He argued that living matter, being a combination of fluidity and solidity in which neither can be 
subordinated to the other, involves different principles, and for the extension of the notion of nature as 
self-forming, Weiss demanded not only a new theory of dynamics, but new mathematical concepts. These 
concepts should grasp nature not merely as external quantity of movement (characteristic of Laplace’s 
physics) but as qualitative change in internal organization. These are the ideas that inspired Justus 
Grassmann who knew Weiss personally, who in turn inspired his son, Hermann Grassmann, with the 
same project (Gare, 2011, 43).7 
Justus Grassmann, following Weiss, attempted to develop a new mathematics, what he thought of 
as a ‘fluid geometry’, that is, a ‘dynamist, morphogenetic mathematics’ that would facilitate insight into 
the emergence and inner synthesis of patterns in nature (Heuser, 2011, 58). As Michael Otte argued, ‘J. 
Grassman defines mathematics in the spirit of Schelling, not Kant, as pure constructivity, as construction 
which does not start from any content or empirical intuition, but solely considers things according to the 
principle of noticing their equality or difference’ (Otte, 67). It was crucial that this mathematics not be 
limited to a theory of quantity and be independent of all relations of quantity so that it could go beyond 
the extrinsic, mechanical behavior of matter and recognize the intrinsic possibilities within nature for 
structuring and organizing. Hermann Grassmann’s work, which he characterized as the ‘theory of 
extension’, continued this project. He presented this work as a survey of a general theory of forms, 
assuming, as he put it, ‘only the general concepts of equality and difference, conjunction and separation’ 
(Grassmann, 1995, 33). Extended magnitude was defined as the magnitude created by the generation of 
difference in which the elements separate and become fixed as separate. It was not a theory of space but 
provided a foundation for such a theory. As Grassmann characterized the aim of his 1844 edition of his 
extension theory in his 1862 edition, it ‘extends and intellectualizes the sensual intuitions of geometry 
into general, logical concepts, and, with regard to abstract generality, is not simply one among other 
branches of mathematics, such as algebra, combination theory, and function theory, but rather far 
surpasses them in that all fundamental elements are unified under this branch, which thus as it were forms 
the keystone of the entire structure of mathematics’ (Grassmann, 2000, xiii).  
This is essentially how David Hestenes and other recent champions of Grassmann’s mathematics 
have interpreted his achievement, seeing him at the same time as the inventor of linear and multilinear 
algebra and the precursor to vector algebra, exterior algebra and Clifford algebra (Fearnley-Sander, 1979, 
809). Grassmann’s exterior algebra has also been recognized as a tensor theory that contributed to the 
development of tensor calculus utilized by Einstein in his general theory of relativity. Clifford algebra 
illustrates the generality of Grassmann’s algebra. It uses Grassmann’s theory to interpret William 
Hamilton’s quaternions (Clifford, 1878), producing an algebra which is less universal because it requires 
some specification of local structure, notably, what ‘perpendicular’ means in order to define rotations 
(Hestenes, 2011; 244; Penrose, 2004, 211).  J. Willard Gibbs and Oliver Heaviside independently of each 
other developed vector calculus, as Gibbs acknowledged, rediscovering Grassmann’s work (Gibbs, 1881, 
1). Gibbs in 1901 also utilized Grassmann’s pioneering notion of multidimensional space to develop the 
idea of n-dimensional phase space in which every degree of freedom or parameter of the system is 
                                                     
7 The Grassmanns were also influenced by Schleiermacher, but then Schleiermacher was also influenced by 
Schelling (Gare, 2011). 
10 
 
represented as an axis of a multidimensional space and every possible state of a system can then be 
represented as a point. Phase space was used to formulate quantum mechanics and for studying stability, 
bifurcations (including ‘catastrophes’) and chaos in systems. Ideas originating in Grassmann’s work were 
also rediscovered and advanced independently by Paul Dirac to lay the foundations for quantum 
electrodynamics and quantum field theory (Penrose, 2005, 208ff., 618ff.). Ernst Cassirer, who was 
strongly influenced by Grassmann, observed that Grassmann had made modern physics possible by 
showing that ‘the real elements of mathematical calculus are not magnitudes but relations’ (Cassirer, 
1923, 99). As Martin Horn noted, ‘Grassmann is not only the forefather of the usual vector and tensor 
algebra we apply when we solve present-day physics problems conceptually. Grassmann’s ideas 
developed into the innumerable concepts we possess today to model our world mathematically’ (Horn, 
2011, 436). It embraces multilinear algebra, projective geometry, distance geometry, hypercomplex 
function theory, differential geometry, Lie groups and Lie algebras (Hestenes, 1996, 198). 
While it is significant that Grassmann’s extension theory has served as a foundation not only for 
mathematical work that Grassmann knew about, but for the mathematics of Hamilton, Bernhard Riemann, 
Gibbs and Dirac and more recent work in mathematics, this is less surprising when it is realized that these 
mathematicians were inspired, directly or indirectly, by the same tradition of thought. Hamilton (one of 
the few mathematicians of Grassmann’s time to appreciate his work from the very beginning) embraced 
Kant’s constructivist philosophy of mathematics and was strongly influenced by and corresponded with 
Coleridge, who in turn had largely appropriated Schelling’s natural philosophy. Hamilton’s mathematics 
was developed as part of an attempt to develop a speculative metaphysics that would go beyond 
Newtonian science as it had been developed by Newton’s successors and, as he wrote to Herschel with 
respect to Faraday’s work, would show ‘light, heat, chemistry, electricity, crystallography (with 
galvanism, magnetism etc. … to be all branches of one science, as yet imperfectly understood’ (Hankins, 
1977, 190). He saw algebra as providing the means to comprehend time. These are the ideas that enabled 
James Clerk Maxwell to model and advance Faraday’s field theory of electro-magnetism on the basis of 
which he was able to oppose reductionist materialism (Harman, 1998). Riemann was even more strongly 
influenced by Schelling’s research program. In accordance with Schelling, Weiss and the Grassmanns, 
Riemann argued that science should not be content with the observation and calculation of the exterior 
aspects of nature, but go ‘further back behind the surface of nature’ (Heuser-Kessler, 1992, 409). 
Riemann was concerned to develop a science that would go ‘beyond the foundations of astronomy and 
physics laid by Galilei and Newton that would be in accordance with continuum theory’ (Heuser-Kessler, 
1992 409f.) and would give a place to life and freedom.  He wanted a general field theory, although he 
was concerned with how discontinuities arose within continuous fields. Examining shock waves, he 
concluded that structure-building processes are non-mechanical and non-deterministic, showing in 
accordance with modern bifurcation theory that they exhibit a non-differentiable quality at a critical point. 
To comprehend this, Riemann looked for a law of freedom, concluding that ‘freedom is very well 
compatible with strict lawfulness of the course of nature’ (Heuser-Kessler, 1992, 411). Reflecting on the 
origins of life, Riemann argued, like Schelling, for an organizing principle that would explain the 
emergence of the first organisms from the inorganic. Also like Schelling, Riemann saw this organizing 
principle operating in human thought. As there is a progressive development towards higher levels of life, 
there is a progressive, creative process of thinking leading to higher levels of thought, he proclaimed.   
Interest in Hermann Grassmann has revived in recent years, with efforts being made by David 
Hestenes and others to use his universal geometric algebra and calculus to provide the unifying 
foundation for all mathematical physics, offering new approaches to quantum theory and general 
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relativity (Hestenes, 2011). However, what needs to be emphasized is that Grassmann’s work continued 
the tradition of Schelling, Weiss, and his father, Justus Grassmann the goal of which was to provide the 
means to grasp the self-formation of nature, including life (Heuser, 1996, Radu, 2000; Petsche, 2009; 
Otte, 2011), and renewed interest reflects the success in physics of this whole research program in its 
opposition to the Newtonian tradition of physics.  
 
3. Theoretical Biology in the Twentieth Century 
 
When the source of the most revolutionary ideas in physics that transformed physics in the 
Twentieth Century is understood, then the paradoxical state of modern biology becomes more 
comprehensible. There has been a steady advance of reductionism apparently triumphing with the 
development of the synthetic theory of evolution, molecular biology and information theory. 
Reductionism privileges physics as the ultimate science to which all other sciences should be reduced. 
Ultimately, biology should be reduced to physics. However, those physicists who have been interested in 
and attempted to contribute to biology including Niels Bohr, Max Delbrück, Erwin Schrödinger, Eugene 
Wigner, Wolfgang Pauli and Walter Elsasser have been overwhelmingly anti-reductionist (Gare, 2008, 
59). This paradox was highlighted by the contribution of a theoretical physicist to a conference organized 
by the theoretical biologist, C.H. Waddington. David Bohm noted that ‘just when physics is moving away 
from mechanism, biology and psychology are moving closer to it. If this trend continues it may well be 
that scientists will be regarding living and intelligent beings as mechanical, while they suppose that 
inanimate matter is too complex and subtle to fit into the limited categories of mechanism’ (Bohm, 1969, 
34). This paradox becomes even more significant when it is realized that the impetus for this anti-
reductionism in physics, without which its greatest achievements over the last two hundred years would 
not have occurred, has been the quest to characterize the physical world in a way that is consistent with 
the emergence of life and the human mind which reductionists have been so resolutely concerned to 
explain away. 
Given the history of modern physics it should not be surprising that the main proponent of 
mathematical biophysics, Nicolas Rashevsky, should have been so concerned to avoid reductionism and 
develop a mathematical approach to life that did it full justice, and that his foremost student, Robert 
Rosen, and those influenced by Rosen, including Rosen’s foremost student, A.H. Louie, should have 
continued this quest. It also should be no surprise that in their effort to do this they have been prepared to 
explore and develop new forms of mathematics and engage in deep reflection about the relationship 
between mathematics and reality and the nature of science itself. Situating their work in this context it 
should be easier not only to evaluate their work but to consider what directions should be taken next, 
specifically, to consider whether and how to complete Rosen’s project of supplying an ontology. 
Furthermore, this should highlight the significance of taking Rosen’s claim that physics has always had to 
retreat in the face of advances in biology seriously. Just as the mathematics inspired by Schelling’s 
speculations designed to account for the emergence of life opened up new approaches to physics which 
eventually revolutionized it, it can be expected that advances in mathematical biophysics will offer new 
perspectives on current physics and perhaps revolutionize it again. However, this could require further 
rethinking about what mathematics is and its relation to science. To appreciate what is at issue it is 
necessary to also look at the broader field of efforts inspired by physics to do justice to the reality of life.  
To begin with, it needs to be asked why the project inspired by Schelling did not succeed in 
delivering a fully satisfactory account of life. When appreciated as a development of Schellingian thought 
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in which nature is understood as essentially process (with force, matter, extension, and space and time 
seen as emergents), Grassmann’s mathematics provides the foundations for an interpretation of modern 
physics consistent with the possibility of the emergence of life and consciousness (in contrast to the 
reductionist materialism of the Newtonians). However, by itself, it does not provide the means to achieve 
this comprehension.  
A major problem that needed to be addressed is the assumption about the goal of scientific 
knowledge identified by Rosen, that it is to develop a largest model, consisting of a set of states, and a 
recursion rule entailing subsequent states from the present states such that every other state of it can be 
obtained by formal deduction. It is this assumption that appears to have influenced the nineteenth century 
neo-Kantian scientists Hermann von Helmholtz and his onetime student Heinrich Hertz, both of whom 
were influenced by the tradition of Naturphilosophie inspired by Schelling, but who then reacted against 
it. They were largely responsible for the subsequent negative image and ignorance of Naturphilosophie 
and Schelling’s contribution to science, and also of Kant’s ideas on biology presented in the Critique of 
Judgment and the achievements of those biologists influenced by Kant (Lenoir, 1986, chap.5).8 
Helmholtz and his students strove to provide mechanist explanations for everything they studied, 
promoting mechanistic reductionism in biology and psychology and opposing Faraday’s and Maxwell’s 
field theory of electro-magnetism (Lützen, 2005).  
Nevertheless, in doing so, they provided ideas that were important for the advance of the post-
mechanist tradition. Denying any place for a life-force, Helmholtz postulated the conservation of ‘force’, 
which he understood only as a property of matter acting at a distance (Lenoir, 1982, 218). This 
conservation principle was later characterized as the conservation of energy and incorporated into 
thermodynamics which was then used to oppose Newtonian physics. Hertz, in his effort to re-establish 
physics on mechanistic foundations and meet objections to it and to refute Maxwell’s field theory through 
experiment, managed to discover radio waves and confirm Maxwell’s theory (which he then claimed was 
nothing but his mathematical equations).9 In his effort to defend Helmholtz’s reductionist conception of 
scientific explanation Hertz also introduced the notion of non-holonomic constraints that later could be 
turned against reductionism. Despite their failure to uphold Newtonian science in physics and their 
inadvertent contribution to post-Newtonian physics, they did succeed in maintaining the Newtonian idea 
of what characterizes genuine science. And as Rosen pointed out, so long as this Newtonian assumption 
about the ideal of scientific explanation is maintained, only mechanistic accounts of nature will be 
respected as truly scientific. 
Before examining and evaluating Rosen’s answer to these problems it is important to look at how 
other theoretical biologists have dealt with them. Of particular significance were Alfred Lotka’s efforts to 
rethink biology through thermodynamics and to treat it mathematically, the work of those associated with 
the theoretical biology movement led by Joseph Needham, C.H. Waddington, Dorothy Wrinch and J.H. 
Woodger and continued by Rene Thom, Brian Goodwin, Mae-Wan Ho and the dynamic structuralists, 
and the biosemioticians led by Jesper Hoffmeyer, Kalevi Kull, Marcello Barbieri and Claus Emmeche 
bolstered by the work of Howard Pattee.10 Lotka was the first major theoretician in the twentieth century 
                                                     
8 Helmholtz’s opposition to Naturphilosophie was due partly to the lack of rigor in many of the Naturphilosophen 
who, disregarding Schelling’s own work, reintroduced the notion of life-force – Lebenskraft. Lenoir’s book reveals 
the extent and richness of the work on biology that was subsequently eclipsed by mechanist, neo-Darwinian biology. 
9 What is not generally appreciated is that this was a real clash of doctrines in physics that was effectively won by 
those influenced by Naturphilosophie, a victory obscured by the rise of positivism and reductionist biology. 
10 This is not exhaustive. For instance, important contributions to mathematics were made by biologists influeneced 
by Engels’ dialectics. Claude Bernard was not only an important experimental and theoretical biologist but also 
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to attempt a systematic mathematical treatment of all aspects of life influenced by post-reductionist 
physical science, having embraced the notion of energy as the basis for understanding life, including 
consciousness (Lotka, 1925, 50). However, he was only minimally anti-reductionist, and apart from his 
work on chemical oscillations, his maximum entropy production principle and his influence on ecology, 
his major work, Elements of Mathematical Biology published in 1925, was most important for the impetus 
it gave to others, including Rashevsky, to apply mathematics to biology.  
 
4. Mathematico-Physico-Chemical Morphology 
 
The members of the theoretical biology movement, who characterizing their work as 
mathematico-physico-chemical morphology, were inspired by the work of Alfred North Whitehead and 
D’Arcy Thompson (Waddington, 1977, 22; Abir-Am, 1987). Whitehead was strongly influenced by 
Maxwell’s physics (on which he wrote his fellowship dissertation) and Hermann Grassmann’s 
mathematics (Whitehead, 1898, vff.; Riche, 2011), characterizing mathematics as ‘the study of pattern’ 
and its transformations, that is, 'with certain forms of process issuing into forms which are components 
for further process' (Whitehead, 1974, 114; 1968, 92). His work was directed at overcoming scientific 
materialism and providing the metaphysical foundations for a post-mechanistic conception of the world 
that could give a place to purpose and sentience in nature (Whitehead, 1968, 148ff.; Code, 1985). Science, 
he argued, ‘is becoming the study of organisms’, with physics investigating one kind of organism, 
biology another (Whitehead, 1932, 129). Members of the theoretical biology movement took up 
Whitehead’s challenge to develop biology on the basis of this metaphysics. In Growth and Form, first 
published in 1917, D’Arcy Thompson applied geometrical analysis to examine large tracts of 
morphology. He argued that forms of nature that exist are the resolution at one instant of time of many 
forces that are governed by rates of change, and changes of form are brought about by changes of forces, 
but his main concern was to reveal the homologies between apparently different forms (Thompson, 1966, 
14). The members of the theoretical biology movement attempted to comprehend the emergence and 
development of such forms. Woodger allied himself with Ludwig von Bertalannfy who had taken up the 
quest to comprehend mathematically epigenesis, that is, the differentiation and generation of such forms 
in the development of organisms (Bertalanffy and Woodger, 1933). As Needham described Bertalannfy’s 
approach, ‘Bertalanffy realises that there are strange realms in mathematics, unknown to most biologists, 
out of which concepts essential for the understanding of living systems may come, and can envisage the 
utilization for biology of order-systems not even involving number and quantity’ (Needham, 1936, 24). 
With this in mind, Bertalanffy and Woodger appropriated the notion of field (from the German biologists 
Hans Driesch and A. Gurwitsch) and developed the notion of ‘morphogenetic field’.  
The notion of fields was further developed by Needham and Waddington who understood them as 
‘wholes actively organizing themselves’, maintaining themselves and generating forms (Needham, 1936, 
102). Epigenesis then was conceived as the emergence of a sequence of progressively more specific fields 
(as for instance, with the differentiation of the field of the whole organism the field of the brain emerges, 
from which in turn fields of the eyes emerge) producing progressively more specific forms. While 
Needham was concerned to examine the role of chemicals in this process, Waddington focused on the 
role of genes. He analyzed the canalization of development along self-stabilizing paths of development 
(chreods) characterized by a tendency for development to return to such paths after being affected by 
                                                                                                                                                                           
called for the application of mathematics to biology. The Indian theoretical physicist Satyendra Nath Bose also made 
contributions to mathematical biology. See Bischof, 2003. 
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perturbations (homeorhesis), unless the perturbations are too great, in which case there might be a switch 
to a different path. He portrayed the possible chreods in a developing organism through ‘epigenetic 
landscapes’, with the different paths for the development of different forms represented as valleys.  A 
number of genes could play a role in influencing the shape of these valleys, while each gene could 
influence a number of valleys. In characterizing the role of genes, Waddington pointed out the 
inappropriateness of efforts to treat them as containing information since ‘a world of information [as 
defined by Shannon and Weaver] is essentially static, in that a system cannot engender new information 
from within itself; the only type of spontaneous change possible is a loss of information’ (Waddington, 
1976, 247f.). Through his own conceptual framework Waddington integrated genetics, development and 
evolution, a synthesis that is now being revived (Gilbert, 1991 & 2000).  
Waddington attempted to extend his ideas mathematically, although he did not think he had 
succeeded. He was one of the first people to appreciate Alan Turing’s 1952 mathematical demonstration 
of how a differentiated form could emerge from an initial homogeneous state (Turing, 1952). In a letter 
written to Turing soon after the publication of his paper, Waddington commended his work, but pointed 
to its limitations in that in biology there is never a completely homogeneous starting point, and more 
importantly, it is necessary to account for the regulation of scale that takes place in the development of 
embryos and show why distinct kinds of tissue are developed, and not intermediate types between these, 
issues that Waddington took up in later work (Waddington, 1952; Roth, 2011, 263f.; Waddington, 1962, 
125ff.). Waddington’s efforts to develop his ideas mathematically were greatly extended by his student, 
Brian Goodwin, who characterized his own work at this early stage as ‘epigenetic thermodynamics’ 
(Waddington, 1962, 45ff.; Goodwin, 1963). Then René Thom, largely inspired by Waddington’s ideas, 
developed what came to be called catastrophe theory (by Christopher Zeeman), although Thom was as 
much concerned with structural stability as with change.  
Thom was a student of Henri Cartan, whose father, E. Cartan was the first French mathematician 
to embrace the work of Grassmann, and whose work was strongly influenced by him. Through dynamical 
systems defined by vector fields, catastrophe theory as developed by Thom models structural stability, 
with special attention given to abrupt changes of state caused by small continuous changes through a 
‘tipping point’. This is an abstract theory of morphogenesis independent of the substrate and the nature of 
the forces that create them. It is a qualitative mathematics in the sense that it meant to provide insight into 
the nature of reality rather than make exact predictions. As David Aubin noted in his study of Thom, of 
the tendencies Hilbert recognized in mathematicians, Thom chose to aim at ‘intuitive understanding, 
[fostering] a more immediate grasp of the objects one studies, a live rapport with them, so to speak’, in 
contrast to those mathematicians who aim at greater abstraction, ‘seeking to crystallize the logical relation 
inherent in the maze of material that is being studied, and to correlate the material in a systematic and 
orderly manner’ (Aubin, 2004, 99). This qualitative mathematics, Thom claimed, is what is needed to 
characterize biological and other phenomena that have hitherto resisted mathematical treatment (Thom, 
1975, xxiii). Of Thom’s work, Waddington wrote in the foreword to the French edition of Structural 
Stability and Morphogenesis, ‘as long ago as 1940, in my book Organizers and Genes, I urged the need to 
develop a topology of biology. In the intervening years, as not even an amateur mathematician, I have 
been quite unable to follow my own prescription. I am all the more grateful, therefore, to René Thom, 
who has now entered the field with such strong and extended effort’ (Thom, 1975, xxi). These ideas are 
now seen as a branch of bifurcation theory and have proved fruitful in a whole range of disciplines, while 
the concepts developed by Thom, in particular, the notion of ‘attractor’ and ‘basin’ of an attractor have 
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been central to the development of chaos theory and complexity theory (Aubin, 2004; Tsatsanis, 2012, 
225).  
While Thom later distanced himself from Waddington’s work (Thom, 1989, 6), Goodwin 
continued to develop and apply forms of mathematics incorporating Thom’s insights to the study of 
epigenesis. While he later embraced and contributed to advances in complexity theory as this was 
developed at the Santa Fe Institute (Solé and Goodwin, 2000), Goodwin’s most original work was 
associated with the mathematical analysis of temporal organization and control systems in cells, analyzing 
the role of entrainment in biological organization and showing mathematically how coupled processes 
characterized by greatly different rates of oscillation interact to control biochemical processes (Goodwin, 
1963), and later, with the mathematical modeling of biological fields controlling morphogenesis, 
providing positional information through phase differences between coupled cellular oscillators (Goodwin 
and Cohen, 1969; Goodwin, 1976). Avoiding both atomistic reduction and holistic description, 
Goodwin’s work showed that ‘the spatial organization of the whole derives from principles relating to the 
global field behavior together with constraints coming from the properties of the entities which are 
generated as parts’ (Goodwin, 1987, 195). Goodwin and his colleagues then interpreted this work through 
the theoretical work of the structuralists, subsequently, characterizing their work as ‘dynamical 
structuralism’ (Goodwin, Sibatani and Webster, 1989). As Goodwin argued, referring to the work of 
Claude Levi-Strauss and Jean Piaget, ‘A field … is an example of a structure in that it belongs to an 
invariant set (the harmonic functions) defined by internal relations (those defining the field equation over 
a domain), each member of which is a transformation of the other (by a change of boundary values)’ 
(Goodwin, 1987, 197). While there were some variations in how this theoretical position was developed, 
a feature of it was that it combined what previously had been regarded as antithetical positions: 
structuralism and functionalism (Ho, 1989 & 2008). The dynamic structuralists recognized and 
interpreted their work on morphogenesis as a development of a tradition going back to Schelling’s 
mentor, Wolfgang Goethe, and embraced Cassirer’s argument that mathematics and science must now 
focus on relations (Webster and Goodwin, 1996). 
Waddington and Goodwin also embraced the work of Ilya Prigogine on dissipative structures or 
self-organizing patterns generated through fluctuations or oscillations in thermodynamically far from 
equilibrium situations. While influenced by Théophile De Donder and von Bertalanffy’s notion of open 
systems, Prigogine had been inspired by Henri Bergson (a philosopher indirectly influenced by Schelling 
through Ravaisson and Boutroux), particularly by Bergson’s claim in Creative Evolution that ‘The more 
deeply we study the nature of time, the better we understand that duration means invention, creation of 
forms, continuous elaboration of the absolutely new’ (Bergson, 1983, 11). Prigogine was thus led to study 
irreversible processes associated with non-equilibrium thermodynamics, and always saw living beings as 
exemplifying these processes (Prigogine, 1977). Later, he came under the influence of Whitehead. The 
first examples of dissipative structures studied by him and his colleagues were hydrodynamic and 
chemical, explaining the Belousov-Zhabotinsky and other reactions. Their work involved developing the 
mathematics required to model the spontaneous formation of order in homogeneous chemical systems and 
defined the general conditions for self-organizing patterning. They then applied these ideas to biological 
processes, explaining the cellular differentiation and pattern formation in the slime mould and other 
organisms, and the dynamics of ecosystems (Prigogine, 1976; Nicolis and Prigogine, 1977 & 1989). 
Goodwin saw this as advancing Turing’s ideas of pattern formation in excitable media (Goodwin, 1994, 
97).  
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While the focus of the theoretical biology movement was on the development of embryos and the 
significance of this for understanding evolution, their work was not confined to these areas, and the ideas, 
including mathematical ideas, have been extended or linked not only to other areas of biology but to the 
physical sciences, psychology and the social sciences. Jean Piaget, whose study of cognitive development 
in animals and humans echoed Schelling’s effort to characterize the development of cognition, aligned his 
own work with Waddington’s developmentalism. He claimed that cognitive development (which includes 
the capacity of humans to understand and develop mathematics as a means to comprehend nature) has its 
own chreods (Piaget, 1971, 18ff.). Thom himself applied his ideas to study language and semiotics 
(Thom, 1983, 214ff.). Heinz von Foerster and Luis Rocha (von Foerster, 1977; Rocha, 1996; Rocha; 
1998) have interpreted Piaget’s constructivism through second-order cybernetics (building on the work of 
Gregory Bateson). 
 
5. The Rise of Biosemiotics 
 
A different branch of this tradition of theoretical biology influenced by Schelling is the work of 
the biosemioticians. The theoretical biology movement gave a place to signs, and influenced by the 
philosophy of Whitehead, strove to conceive life in a way that would make intelligible and give a place to 
teleology and the emergence of consciousness. However, the biosemioticians are led naturally to connect 
these phenomena through their focus on signs. The original members of this movement were inspired by 
the work of Jacob von Uexküll, C.S. Peirce and Gregory Bateson, among others, (Hoffmeyer, 2008, 3; 
Favereau, 2008; Barbieri, 2009; Favareau, 2010), and defended their research program by integrating it 
with the work of Howard Pattee. Von Uexküll argued that organisms can only be understood properly 
when seen in interaction with their environments which they define as their Umwelt, or ‘surrounding 
world’ (Kull, 2001). That is, they act on the basis of a model of themselves situated within their 
environments. This was a generalization of Kant’s characterization of humans as actively constituting 
their worlds through imagination, forms of intuition and the categories of the understanding, but the 
notion that every organism has a world, as opposed to dead matter which does not, had already been 
suggested by Schelling, as noted above (Schelling, 2004, 112n‡; Gare, 2011, 55). Peirce straightforwardly 
described himself as ‘a Schellingian of some stripe’ and openly acknowledged that he was strongly 
influenced by Schelling’s early work on the philosophy of nature (Gare, 2011, 64). Gregory Bateson was 
the founder of second order cybernetics (named as such by von Foerster) which took up again the 
problem raised by Schelling that we are part of the world we are trying to understand and cannot gain a 
perspective from outside this world. It investigates the construction of models of cybernetic systems, 
recognizing the importance of self-organization, that the investigators are part of the system they are 
investigating and consequently the inescapability of self-referentiality and the problem of the division 
between subject and object.  
Peirce’s target was mechanistic science, the belief that ‘the laws of mechanics determine 
everything that happens according to immutable attractions and repulsion’ and the ‘instantaneous state of 
things from which every other state of things is calculable consists in the positions and velocities of all 
the particles at any instant’ (Peirce, 1992, 300). While contributing to the development of mathematics 
and physics and affirming Kant’s dictum that there is as much real science in a discipline as there is 
mathematics in it, Peirce questioned how far mathematics, at least as currently understood, could take 
science in comprehending the world. As he observed: ‘It would seem as if there were an increase in 
variety [in the universe], would it not? And yet mechanical law, which the scientific infallibilist tells us is 
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the only agency of nature, mechanical law can never produce diversification. That is a mathematical truth 
– a proposition of analytic mechanics; and anybody can see without any algebraical apparatus that 
mechanical law out of like antecedents can only produce like consequents. It is the very idea of law’ 
(Peirce, 1955, 357). Nevertheless, it was through his reflections on mathematics that Peirce concluded 
that there are three basic categories, the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness, applicable to 
anything that can be experienced or thought of.  To reconcile science with the emergence of variety, 
including humanity, Peirce conjectured that lawfulness in nature emerged from indeterminate chaos 
which, through a tendency to take on habits, produced a difference which could be identified (a firstness), 
followed by something else, which introduced opposition into nature, which is a secondness. These 
opposing differentiated identities could then be connected, which is a thirdness. On this basis, Peirce 
defended an evolutionary cosmology in which a place could be given to final causation, and privileged 
‘semiosis’, the production and interpretation of signs, over deterministic laws. His most general definition 
of a sign, again involving firstness, secondness and thirdness, was that which ‘mediates between an object 
and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines 
the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the 
object through the mediation of the “sign”’ (Peirce, 1998, 410). While Peirce argued that semiosis is 
ubiquitous in nature, his work focused primarily on semiosis in humans, with his main interest being in 
logic, mathematics and science. Most biosemioticians interpreted Von Uexküll’s notion of Umwelt 
through Peirce’s semiotics and extended this concept from animals to plants and cells. Following Kalevi 
Kull, symbolic semiosis associated with thought and language is seen to presuppose ‘animal semiosis’, 
semiosis where the interpretant is action, which in turn presupposes ‘vegetative semiosis’, where the 
interpretant is growth, which in turn presupposes semiosis within and between cells within the organism, 
that is, ‘endosemiosis’ (Kull, 2000; Hoffmeyer, 2008). The fusion of biosemiotics with Bateson’s second 
order cybernetics has produced the new field of cybersemiotics (Brier, 2008). 
Since Peirce and von Uexküll were inspired by the same tradition of thought, integrating their 
ideas did not present any major difficulties. Plant germination and embryogenesis were characterized as 
sign operations in which the DNA containing a coded version of the parents is interpreted by the fertilized 
ovule or egg and converted into a three dimensional organism, the interpretant (Hoffmeyer, 1996, 19f.). 
While this whole process can be seen as one semiotic act, it can be analysed into a multiplicity of smaller 
semiotic acts. For instance, the fertilization of an ovum can be seen as itself a semiotic act in which the 
ovum fertilized by the sperm constructively interprets the paternal input, resulting in the zygote (Huber 
and Schmid-Tannwald, 2008). Such vegetative semiosis reflexively incorporates the past and present into 
the future, anticipating not only the features of the environment the offspring will encounter on the basis 
of what the parent successfully defined as its surrounding world and survived within, but variations and 
unpredictable contingencies in this environment. Some grasshoppers, for instance, in response to signs 
from their environment can grow into locusts rather than normal grasshoppers, preparing them to adapt to 
a different environment than their parents, and embryos are generally equipped with some capacity to 
adapt to environments never previously encountered.  
Some of the complexity of vegetative semiosis is illustrated by research on plants. As Günther 
Witzany (who was inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jürgen Habermas rather than Peirce) observed:  
We now know plants as highly sensitive organisms which actively sense their environment on 
different levels within their plant body (intraorganismic) and interact with same, related, and 
nonrelated plants (interorganismic); with nonplant organisms such as fungi, bacteria, and animals 
(transorganismic); and—additionally—with abiotic influences from the environment such as 
18 
 
nutrient and water availability, light, gravity, wind, and temperature. … Plants assess their 
surroundings, estimate how much energy they need for particular goals, and then realize the 
optimum variant. Plants constantly take measures to control certain environmental resources. … 
Intraorganismic communication involves sign-mediated interactions in cells (intracellular) and 
between cells (intercellular). Intercellular communication processes are crucial in coordinating 
growth and development, shape, and dynamics. Such communication must function on both the 
local level as well as between widely separated plant parts. This allows plants to react in a 
differentiated manner to its current developmental status and physiological influences (Witzany, 
2012, 1f.). 
Such vegetative semiosis, which produces and maintains functioning structures, is shared by animals and 
humans and is the condition for their forms of semiosis.  
To begin to account for such complexity, rapid development, anticipation and responses to new 
situations, it is necessary to recognize that development takes place at multiple semi-autonomous levels 
simultaneously, with levels transacting with each other. It is necessary to recognize that such development 
is controlled on the basis of memory and anticipation, and to conceptualize what this control involves and 
how it could emerge, and then show how such control relates to the laws of physics. Such control requires 
monitoring by the organism of itself and its environment, and this involves the interpretation of signs. 
Consequently, it is necessary to account for the possibility of the emergence of sign interpretations or 
symbols. And then it is necessary to account for how such control utilizing signs relating the past to the 
future can causally influences chemical processes.  
René Thom offered a mathematical treatment of signs and their origins, defending Peirce’s 
trichotomy between signs of Icon, Index and Symbol (Thom, 1983, 261ff.). However it was the work of 
Howard Pattee that was embraced by the biosemioticians. A theoretical physicist, Pattee has for over forty 
years attempted to explain these possibilities, and in doing so, has provided strong support for the 
biosemioticians (Pattee, 1968; Favareau, 2010). Doing so has involved facing up to the conceptual 
problems in modern physical science. The idea of nature governed by physical laws and the idea of 
symbols and semiotic controls are incommensurable. Laws are global and inexorable, while controls are 
local and conditional, and imply that events could be otherwise than they are. Semiotic controls require 
measurement, memory and selection which can be described statistically and are irreversible. They are 
not functionally describable by mathematically described physical laws based on energy, time and rates of 
change. However, they are structurally describable in the language of physics in terms of ‘non-integrable’ 
or ‘non-holonomic’ rather than ‘holonomic’ constraints (to use terms coined by Heinrich Hertz). That is, 
they are local rather than global constraints. Non-holonomic constraints facilitate hierarchical ordering 
different from the structural hierarchy of a crystal, which is characterized by a permanent loss of degrees 
of freedom, and from liquids and gases which have too few constraints. Non-holonomic constraints give a 
place to 'function', and as Pattee argued, a function is 'a process in time, and for living systems the 
appearance of time-dependent functions is the essential characteristic of hierarchical organization' (Pattee, 
1970, 127). With this function the constraints must be variable and imposed on only select degrees of 
freedom of the constituent processes or entities.  
Recognizing that there are degrees of freedom to be differentially constrained involves rejecting a 
central assumption of classical physics. It is always necessary to distinguish the observer from the 
observed, but the observer cannot be left out of account nor included in what is observed. This distinction 
is required by the assumptions of physics. Even Newton recognized a principled distinction between laws 
and initial conditions, and in general, the study of any system involves recognizing these initial conditions 
along with local control constraints of the measuring device, even if this is only a clock. These are the 
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boundary conditions of what is studied in any experiment. While originally science was biased towards 
accepting the mathematically describable physical laws as ontologically basic and the problem of 
measurement derivative, as the significance of measurement came to be recognized in thermodynamics, 
relativity theory and quantum theory, the status of these opposing conceptualizations has been gradually 
reversed. To make such measurement intelligible in physical terms, von Neumann suggested that 
statistical concepts should be recognized as truly original and probability logics more fundamental than, 
and irreducible to, strict logics, with models of physical laws and semiotic controls being complementary. 
That is, it is necessary to uphold an ontology and cosmology of the kind Peirce proposed. 
In the case of living organisms, this distinction between dynamics and the boundary conditions 
associated with measurement is involved in their very existence. Constructing a model of a self-
replicating system, von Neumann showed that such a system must have not only material components but 
a symbolic description of itself as part of it, independently of any observer (von Neumann, 1966). For 
there to be reproduction, there must be measurements taking place in the system quite apart from any 
scientific investigation of these self-replicating systems. For the individual system to be a physical 
implementation, such self-replication requires that all the components that describe, translate and 
construct, be themselves described, translated and constructed within the ‘self’ that is being replicated. As 
Pattee argued, developing von Neumann’s work, there must be ‘semiotic closure’ (Pattee, 2008, 127).  
Following Michael Polanyi, Pattee argued that controls associated with such self-replication in 
organisms form a subsumption hierarchy in which there is emergence through the introduction of further 
informational constraints, echoing and augmenting Schelling’s insight that emergence of new levels of 
organization and freedom come about through limiting activity. (Polanyi also argued that to properly 
understand these holistic aspects of systems it is necessary to ‘indwell’ in them, again echoing Schelling’s 
view that nature should be grasped from the inside (Polanyi, 1958, 195f.)). There can be many levels of 
such hierarchical organization through such constraining of constituent processes (Pattee, 1973) involving 
a form of downward causation. The constraint of selection of variant offspring is one, but only one, of 
these constraints. These hierarchically ordered constraints are facilitative, opening up new possibilities by 
closing off other possibilities, with the most important facilitative constraints being associated with codes. 
Just as the codes of languages make possible an enormous range of utterances, so the natural codes make 
possible an enormous range of biological structures, processes and activities. Developing these ideas, 
Pattee’s work was ideally suited to providing a rigorous defence of biosemiotics. 
Marcello Barbieri, the biosemiotician whose work has focused most on codes, argues that natural 
codes have three features: they bring into correspondence two independent ‘worlds’, there is a system of 
molecular adaptors, and there is a set of rules that guarantee biological specificity (Barbieri, 2008a, 189). 
The first of these codes, associated with the origin of life, Barbieri claimed (to some extent in opposition 
to Hoffmeyer) are the ‘ribosoids’ consisting of RNA and proteins which synthesize proteins (one world) 
from genes (another world) according to specific rules. Such codes are an essential component of life, 
and, he argues, precede interpretation (Barbieri, 2008b). This is only one code, however, and Barbieri has 
described a range of codes, including the splicing codes of eukaryotes, the adhesion codes of 
multicellulars, the pattern codes of animals and the linguistic codes of humans (Barbieri, 2003, 233). 
Hoffmeyer and Emmeche argued (following Gregory Bateson and Anthony Wilden), that codes can be 
digital or analogue (Hoffmeyer and Emmeche, 1991). Digital codes are based on discrete sign tokens 
(which require stable structures that can be maintained through the vicissitudes of environmental changes) 
with an arbitrary relation between the sign and the signified. Such codes free messages from the 
constraints of natural laws, allowing ‘impossible’ interpretants, such as organisms that are incapable of 
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surviving, to be produced. They are relatively free from the flux of becoming, and so are ideal for 
memory, and they facilitate abstraction and thereby meta-messages, a role played in organisms by 
regulatory genes (Hoffmeyer, 2008a, 87f.). Each of these characteristics facilitates greater plasticity and 
creativity, but at the expense of dissociation from immediately recognizable processes on which digital 
coding is ultimately dependent. Analogue coding, by contrast, is indexical or iconic, based on some kind 
of similarity within the spatio-temporal continuity, or in internal relations such as between cause and 
effect, or in the relation between part and whole (Hoffmeyer, 2008, 89). Digital and analogue codes and 
the processes they control can and do interact with each other, and this interaction generates much of the 
enormous complexity associated with organisms, and as Hoffmeyer argues, makes evolution possible. 
However, while codes can account for a great deal of the complexity of life, there are other ways 
in which complexity can be generated, and these interact with the processes generated by codes 
(Kauffman, 1993 & 2000; Cohen, 2003). An effort to take into account all this complexity, combining 
Prigogine’s work on thermodynamics, Peircian semiotics and Pattee’s work on symbols, facilitative 
constraints and hierarchical order, has been undertaken by Stanley Salthe (1993), reconciling biosemiotics 
and hierarchy theory.  
 
6. Rosen’s Relational Biology 
 
Rosen was at one time a colleague of Pattee and engaged with similar problems. Like Pattee, he 
also was strongly influenced by von Neumann and centrally concerned with the problem of measurement; 
he also accepted von Neumann’s argument that a self-replicating system must include a representation of 
itself. Like Pattee, he argued that emergence, including the emergence of life, involves non-holonomic 
constraints which ‘limit the number and kinds of behavior which the system can exhibit’ (Rosen, 1988, 
23). Non-holonomic constraints, he pointed out, are not global but local, being a function of other phase 
variables. As these constraints are increased, velocity comes to depend entirely on configuration and can 
be specified as a vector field in configuration space. Such systems ‘cannot be treated by classical 
mechanical ideas at all’ (Rosen, 1988, 25). It is not at all clear that Rosen abandoned his interest in 
emergence through non-holonomic constraints (as Pattee apparently believed – Pattee, 2007). But in his 
later work, Rosen became more interested in mathematically modeling the distinctive features of life itself 
- most importantly, anticipation, independently of its material substrate - and more radically questioning 
received ideas about modeling systems. In following this path Rosen was advancing von Bertalannfy’s 
general system theory and the relational biology of Rashevsky while utilizing Category Theory as 
developed by Saunders Mac Lane.  
Rashevsky described the goal of mathematical biophysics in 1936 at a meeting with Niels Bohr 
and others in Copenhagen. It was to develop ‘mathematical biology as a rational theoretical science, 
according to patterns suggested by theoretical physics’ (Abraham, 2004, 360). He invented one of the first 
models of the neuron and originated the idea of neural networks based on the idea of continuous 
modeling. Walter Pitts, who with Warren McCulloch created the idea of a discrete, logic based neural net, 
the foundation for digital computers, was one of Rashevsky’s students. Dissatisfied with his piecemeal 
approach that missed the nature of life as such, Rashevsky then redefined his research direction to look 
for general principles in biology. To begin with, he looked at the principle of Optimal Design, examining 
how ‘for a set of prescribed biological functions the organism has the optimal possible design with respect 
to economy of material used, and energy expenditure, needed for the performance of a prescribed 
function’ (Cull, 2007, 180), rejecting the idea that such design could be explained as nothing more than 
21 
 
the effect of natural selection. Later, he attempted to formulate more general principles, offering a 
topological analysis focused on relations between functional components and the whole organism rather 
than on measurement.  
Although he studied at Göttingen, the stronghold of Hilbert’s formalism, Mac Lane rejected 
formalism. In accordance with Schelling’s understanding of concepts, he argued that mathematical 
concepts originate in practices and only then are refined and elaborated as mathematical concepts (Mac 
Lane, 1981; 1990). Mathematics cannot be understood as simply the manipulation of rigorously defined 
terms according to specified rules. Henri Poincaré had shown how to create algebraic models of 
geometrical objects, and then group theoretic images of topological spaces, then how to deduce properties 
of the latter from the former. These ideas were further developed by Emmy Noether by applying group 
theory to topology. Her insights provided the basis for B.L. van der Waerden (in 1930) to reconceive 
algebra as the elucidation of structures of which groups, ideals, rings, fields etc. are individual 
realizations. On this basis, Oystein Ore in 1935 attempted to develop a general foundation for abstract 
algebra through the concept of ‘lattice’, which he designated ‘structure’. This new image of algebra as the 
study of structures was embraced by the Bourbaki group and extended from algebra to the whole of 
mathematics, although as Leo Corry has shown, their own concept of structure contributed little to the 
development of this new conception of mathematics (Corry, 2004). Category Theory as developed by 
Samuel Eilenberg and Mac Lane in 1945, Corry argued, provided better tools for elucidating the non-
formal notion of mathematical structure. In doing so, Category Theory provided a general theory of 
modeling relations within mathematics. As Rosen described this: 
Category Theory comprises … the general theory of formal modelling, the comparison of 
different modes of inferential or entailment structures. Moreover, it is a stratified or hierarchical 
structure without limit. The lowest level, which is familiarly understood by Category Theory, is 
… a comparison of different kinds of entailment in different formalisms. The next level is, 
roughly, the comparison of comparisons. The next level is the comparison of these, and so on 
(Rosen 1991, 54). 
Effectively, this offered a formal image of the modeling process itself that could then be used to 
investigate the relations between different inferential structures within mathematics (Rosen, 1990. 196f.) 
This was then utilized by Rosen to analyse modeling generally, expressing in a purely mathematical realm 
the pattern of relations between one model and another and between models and ‘objects’, including the 
relationship between mathematical models and what is modeled in the world (Rosen, 1993). 
Through his relational biology Rashevsky, like Pattee, was reintroducing the notion of ‘function’ 
which had all but been excluded from mainstream biology and from science generally, except when it was 
taken as shorthand for why some feature of a species of organism had been preserved in the struggle for 
survival. Rosen utilized Category Theory to examine the assumptions of Aristotelian and Newtonian 
science and the relationship between Newton’s assumptions and the mathematics deployed by him and his 
successors, revealing thereby how science had locked itself into a path that denied the objective reality of 
function, and more fundamentally, of final causes, and thereby excluded the fundamental question ‘What 
is Life?’ He showed how reductionists avoid this question by constructing a small surrogate universe of 
various fractionated components of organisms that can be explained by methods that have sometimes 
worked in other areas of science, and then taking these isolated fractions as the surrogate for the whole 
living system. They then identify science with the methods used to investigate these fractions. The 
possibility of revealing this to be deficient is then blocked by redefining science - not through its content 
and the kinds of questions it must answer - but by specifying the method of investigation, which is then 
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identified with what is ‘objective’. This has led to the exclusion of final causes on the grounds that there 
is no objective scientific method for studying final causes, confusing the meaning of objectivity, a 
confusion illustrated by Jacques Monod’s claim that: ‘The cornerstone of the scientific method is the 
postulate that nature is objective. In other words, the systematic denial that “true” knowledge can be 
reached by interpreting phenomena in terms of final causes – that is to say, of “purpose”’ (Monod, 1974, 
30). Unraveling this confusion, Rosen showed the real issue and the real problem to be how to develop a 
mathematical structure in which the logical entailments within the mathematics models adequately reflect 
the causal entailments in what is investigated. In biology, what is being investigated are living beings. 
Rather than invoke an inadequate surrogate universe, it is necessary to appreciate the full reality of life 
itself characterized by final causes and functionality of components (Rosen 1991 108ff.). Functional 
components cannot be fractionated and treated independently of the organism since they are aspects of 
and definable only through the whole organism.  
Recognizing a place for final causes, Rosen set out to model anticipatory systems, systems which 
do not simply respond to their environments but anticipate and respond to what will happen in the future 
(Rosen, 2012). That physics at present has no place for the influence of future conditions and final causes 
indicates, Rosen argued, that it is too specific and conceptually limited, just as nineteenth century physics 
was too specific and conceptually limited to account for atomic spectra, radioactivity and chemical 
bonding. Just as to explain these required the conceptual revolutions of relativity theory and quantum 
theory, so a new conceptual revolution is required. Rosen questioned the primacy given to closed systems 
in science, arguing that open systems are generic, and a closed system is an extremely degenerate case of 
an open system (Rosen, 1987, 316). Along with this, he also questioned the notion of ‘state’ in science 
and reality, suggesting that it is a fiction. The conceptual revolution required to account for life will also 
require a new mathematics. The mathematics of Heaviside and Dirac gave a place to discontinuous 
signals (the δ-function), which were initially discounted or denigrated (by von Neumann among others) as 
not genuine mathematics. Nevertheless, they eventually had to be accepted and the old mathematics 
relegated to the status of a special case. Similarly, new mathematics will have to be developed that will 
relegate the old mathematics to the status of a special case (Rosen, 1991, 28ff.) This is what Rosen set out 
to do.  
Modeling anticipatory systems involves modeling systems that produce their own components (in 
accordance with how Kant and Schelling understood living organisms). To do this, they require models of 
themselves (as von Neumann argued). Such systems, Rosen showed, can be represented through synthetic 
models in which functional components are the direct product of the system. In these models the 
components are context dependent, and cannot be reduced to fractional parts conceivable independently 
of the models. Such systems are complex, but not as mainstream complexity theory understands 
complexity. This theory, Rosen claimed, had not freed itself from Newtonian assumptions and dealt only 
with the complicated. Genuine complexity requires multiple formal descriptions which are not derivable 
from each other, to capture all their properties. The example Rosen produced to illustrate this was his 
metabolism, repair, reproduction models (the M-R systems). These models consist of three algebraic 
maps, one of which represents the efficient cause of metabolism in a cell, another, the efficient cause of 
repair (that repairs damage to the metabolic processes), and the third represents replication which repairs 
damage to the repair process (Rosen, 1991, 248ff.). Each of these maps has one of the other two as a 
member of its co-domain, and is itself a member of the co-domain of the remaining map. The maps thus 
form a loop of mutual containment. As Rosen put it: ‘a material system is an organism if, and only if, it is 
closed to efficient causation. That is, if ƒ is any component of such a system, the question “why ƒ” has an 
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answer within the system, which corresponds to the category of efficient cause of ƒ’ (Rosen, 1991, 244). 
On the basis of such models it is possible to appreciate the ability of complex systems to incorporate 
models of themselves in their environments into their behaviour, anticipating future events and correcting 
their behaviour as new information sheds light on the anticipatory process (Rosen, 2000, 199).  
Such models, being reflexive, contain self-referencing definitions or ‘impredicativities’, the 
‘vicious circles’ that Bertrand Russell claimed were always associated with self-referential loops. These, 
Russell argued, had to be avoided through his ‘theory of types’ which prohibited self-reference (terms 
being defined appearing in the definition). Rosen claims that organisms, having models of themselves, are 
full of impredicativities. The effort to exclude these was part of the effort to achieve certainty in 
mathematics by reducing the semantics of mathematical language to syntax; that is, the rules of how we 
are permitted to manipulate terms from one proposition to another, while ruling out any reference to what 
terms denote (such as the geometrical object ‘triangle’, and beyond this object, to triangular objects in the 
perceived world). If this were possible, then mathematics could be identified with what is computable on 
a digital computer. ‘Objectivity’ in mathematics would then be equated with computations that can be 
carried out by a properly programmed machine. It would be a matter of software and hardware. Such a 
machine, Rosen pointed out, ‘is, in material terms, entirely a classical device, both in its hardware and in 
its software; all it could see of a non-classical, quantum realm is noise’ (Rosen, 1996, 211). However, as 
he also pointed out, this program of reducing semantics to syntax was shown by Kurt Gödel to be 
impossible. Gödel showed further that what is modeled by a formal system in which all entailment is 
syntactical entailment is richer and more complex than its model. Just as arithmetic cannot be fully 
encompassed by the model of it formulated through set theory and logic, the richness of natural systems 
(selected portions of the external world) cannot be encompassed by arithmetic, or any other formal model 
of them. Selecting a natural system and measurement are, and should be recognized as, abstractions. 
Restricting models to classical computable models, as noted in the introduction to this paper, would 
entrench the identification of objectivity with the elimination of final causes and the mechanistic view of 
nature. But, as Rosen pointed out, systems governed by syntax alone are small, inferentially weak and are 
not generic of mathematical systems as a whole, which are full of impredicativities. These provide the 
entailments to model living organisms with semantic elements that depend entirely on the context created 
by the circle of self reference associated with the reflexivity of anticipatory systems (Rosen, 2000, 135f.). 
Such models involve necessary ambiguities and cannot be simulated on a computer, and this is what 
makes them indispensible for understanding biological and cognitive functions (Louie & Kercel, 2007).   
 
7. Completing the Project of Overcoming the Newtonian Paradigm 
 
By offering a history of post-reductionist mathematical biology and physics from the perspective 
of a tradition of science inspired by Schelling under the influence of Kant and Goethe and characterizing 
its development, I hope to have shown that real progress has been made in this tradition, even though it is 
seldom recognized as a tradition by those who have advanced it. It is a tradition that has assumed and then 
developed Kant’s insights on knowledge, mathematics and biology and defended these more strongly and 
taken them further than did Kant himself, or most of his neo-Kantian champions. Many neo-Kantians, 
inspired by von Helmholtz’s ‘Back-to-Kant’ movement, which was really a movement to oppose the 
influence of Naturphilosophie, adhered to Kant’s claim that ‘without mechanism we cannot gain insight 
into the nature of things’ (1987, §77). Like von Helmholtz, they held that to be truly scientific, biology 
must seek reductionist, mechanistic explanations and allow no role to purpose (Lenoir, 1982, 197ff.). 
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Kant’s concept of ‘natural purpose’ was accepted only for its heuristic value. Although Kant himself was 
opposed to evolutionary theories, this approach could be assimilated easily to and lend support for 
Darwinian evolutionary theory. It is this attitude that led von Bertalanffy to complain that ‘Kant who, in 
his epoch, appeared to be the great destroyer of all “dogmatism,” to us appears as the paradigm of 
unwarranted absolutism and dogmatism’ (von Bertalanffy, 1968, 227). However, there were exceptions, 
and these are now becoming more common.11 The neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer (admired by von 
Bertalanffy) advanced Kant’s work and in doing so, had a significant influence on the dynamic 
structuralists (Webster and Goodwin, 1997, 104ff.). Cassirer did so by embracing ideas originally 
developed by Schelling and those he inspired. He was strongly influenced by Hermann Grassmann’s 
mathematics and philosophy, using this work to argue that from then on science should focus on relations 
and functions. He then defended Goethe’s work on morphology and, like a number of other Kantian 
philosophers of science, gave a place to conceptual revolutions. These developments not only accorded 
with Schelling’s philosophy but supported Schelling’s argument for Speculative Physics. But Schelling 
was barely mentioned. While this is beginning to change with more recent neo-Kantian work in 
theoretical biology, this typifies the tendency to ignore or misrepresent Schelling and then to deny his 
influence while advancing his ideas.  
Achieving proper recognition for Schelling by itself is relatively unimportant, however. What 
matters is that through ignoring or misrepresenting the range of contributions to mathematics, physics, 
chemistry, biology and cognitive development by Schelling and those directly or indirectly influenced by 
him, and also the contributions of those who developed similar ideas independently, there has been a 
fragmentation of and weakening of the potential of the research of those striving to overcome the 
Newtonian paradigm. This brief history is designed to identify and thereby recover the history of what is 
really a tradition that has inherited and then developed assumptions and goals and made major advances 
over generations, while not being recognized as a tradition. By identifying post-reductionist science as a 
tradition the aim is to reunify it, to orient those committed to overcoming the Newtonian paradigm in 
biology to advance this project, and to provide support for all those engaged in this project. In particular, 
this history is designed to suggest how mathematical, theoretical and empirical work by the theoretical 
biology movement focusing on epigenesis aligned with work on cognitive development, work by the 
biosemioticians on semiotics and work by relational biologists on anticipatory systems might better be 
brought to bear on each other and be situated in relation to mathematics and other sciences. Of course this 
is not meant to exclude recognition of other developments in post-reductionist science not even indirectly 
influenced by Schelling. Some examples of these are described by Letelier et.al. (2011). The most 
important instance of such work has been the development of Category Theory building on the work of 
Henri Poincaré who, as a French neo-Kantian, was not in any way influenced by Grassmann’s 
mathematics. And individual researchers by virtue of their own observations or insights that challenge 
mainstream assumptions, and then struggle to have their voices heard, should always be recognized as 
among the most important contributors to the advancement of science. What is presented is meant first of 
all to strengthen the claims of all researchers whose work brings into question prevailing reductionist 
assumptions, to show where resources can be found to further defend and develop their work, and then to 
offer some suggestions for further research. These should be taken as suggestions, not prescriptions.  
What contribution does it make to recognize an anti-reductionist tradition in mathematical 
biology? Both the theoretical biology movement inspired by Whitehead and the biosemiotic movement 
                                                     
11 See for example the work of Gertrudis van de Vijver. 
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inspired by von Uexküll and Peirce insisted on giving a place to teleology and function in nature and life. 
However, in both cases they did so by delimiting the domain of validity of mathematics while still 
according a place to mathematics. The significance of Rosen’s work, building on the work of Rashevsky 
and Mac Lane, is that he has shown how final causes can be modeled mathematically. He has thus 
legitimated the role that other anti-reductionists accorded to teleology and function, greatly strengthening 
the claims they make for their insights made on this assumption. However, as noted, Rosen’s work was 
unfinished, and it has not been finished by his disciple, Louie. There are questions about the relationship 
between his earlier work done in collaboration with Pattee and his later work. His later work was 
concerned with the nature of biological order independent of its material substrate, but despite Pattee’s 
qualms, it would appear that there is no reason why anyone embracing the arguments of Rosen’s later 
work would dismiss his work on hierarchical order, or assume that he did not accept that biomolecular 
structures and biogenetic processes are required to support and allow the emergence of functional ultra-
complexity. With minor modifications, Rosen’s work should provide a rigorous framework for defending, 
integrating and further advancing the work of both the theoretical biology movement and their allies and 
the biosemioticians. 
To achieve this, it is necessary to complete Rosen’s project of providing an ontology. That Rosen 
believed this necessary is not surprising if we appreciate his defence of Aristotle’s approach to science 
and his condemnation of efforts to define science as a method. Just as he believed it is necessary to ask 
the question What is Life? it is necessary to ask the question What is Being? Such an ontology should 
provide the basis for assessing and integrating other work in science, including related work in biology, 
and orient science for new research. Rosen clearly had this in mind, and believed that the insights he had 
gained through the study of life could illuminate physics, the social sciences and politics as well as 
biology. By situating the tradition of mathematical biophysics in relation to and as part of the broader 
tradition of post-reductionist thought, which includes also the theoretical biology movement and the new 
tradition of biosemiotics, it should become clearer what this ontology would be and how it would 
facilitate the integration of work in mathematical biophysics, the theoretical biology movement and 
biosemiotics. From there it should be possible to get a clearer idea of the challenges facing this tradition 
and how these challenges might be met. It should also be possible to gain a clearer insight into the 
importance of this work for physics and the other physical sciences, and for society. However, it should 
also reveal where Rosen’s work can be fruitfully revised and built upon.  
Since this anti-reductionist tradition of mathematical biology originates in the work of Schelling, 
it is his conception of being that should be taken as the starting point for characterizing this new ontology. 
As Schelling argued, ontology has to give a place within nature to human consciousness of nature. We 
must recognize that we are part of the world that we are trying to know, with all the problems this poses 
for characterizing this knowledge. Central to Schelling’s proposed ontology, making intelligible the 
emergence and evolution of life and consciousness, is that it is self-organizing activity (or ‘productivity’), 
in which forces, matter, space and time, living organisms and consciousness, including our consciousness 
of nature and ourselves, are products generated by this self-organizing process through limiting activity, 
with the products of this process: matter, organisms and humans themselves, being self-organizing 
participants in this process. Self-organizing activity involves ‘community of causation’ or immanent 
causation in which relations are essential and central. These are the basic ideas which were then reworked 
by a tradition of natural philosophers and metaphysicians in the tradition that originated with Schelling, 
including Bergson, Peirce and Whitehead. As Kampis showed in his work on self-modifying systems, 
these are the ideas consistent with his own and Rosen’s work (Kampis, 1991, 462ff.). While this is still a 
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developing tradition with no final consensus on the characterization of physical existence, it is a tradition 
that has privileged temporality in the process of creative becoming and treated what previously had been 
assumed as basic to physical existence (such as space, measurable time, matter and lawful dynamics as 
understood in the Newtonian tradition of thought) as derivative products of this creative becoming that 
must be accounted for. In doing so it gives a place to indeterminacy and emergence, to multiple levels of 
becoming based on different process rates and temporal scale as well as spatial scale, and in one way or 
another, to anticipation and final causes. It was a version of this ontology that Rosen appears to have been 
developing, granting a central role to relations and to the complexity of temporality. 
Rosen embraced Rössler’s endophysics which sought not only to defend but reveal the 
implications of accepting that we are part of the world we are striving to know (Rosen, 1993). Like 
Schelling, Rosen appreciated the problematic status but necessity of the discriminations required to gain 
such knowledge; that is, to know the world of which we are part we have to differentiate ourselves from 
the world. ‘Science is built on dualities’ Rosen wrote, and ‘the most fundamental dualism, which all 
others presuppose, is of course the one a discriminator makes between self and everything else’ (Rosen, 
1991, 40). He characterized ‘everything else’ as the self’s ambiance. The second dualism is associated 
with the partition of this ambience between systems and their environments. Rosen interpreted the role of 
models on the basis of such discriminations, that is, between the model and the system modeled, 
introducing a third dualism.  
A criticism that can be leveled at Rosen in this account of partitioning is that he has recognized 
only dualities, that is, the dualities between the self and its ambiance, between systems and their ambiance 
and then models and what the systems modeled. This is one place where Rosen’s work could benefit from 
other advances in the post-reductionist tradition. Peirce in his efforts to develop and augment Schelling’s 
ontology had already pointed out that most of the aporias of modern thought derive from such dualisms, 
and showed how these could be avoided by recognizing triadic relations (Gare, 2007, 5f.). Semiosis, for 
instance, involves not just a sign and its object, but a sign, its object and its interpretant. In the case of 
science, there is at least the proposition formulated by an investigating scientist (for instance a 
mathematical model), the object being investigated (the system or structure being modeled) and the 
interpretant, the idea in the mind of another scientist listening to or reading the work of the first scientist. 
Similarly, in a sympathetic study of Rosen, Cottam, Ranson and Vounckx have rejected Rosen’s binary 
separation of assemblies into mechanisms and organisms and called for a threefold segregation so that the 
organism can be seen as the complex interface between mechanism and ecosystem (2007).  
Cottam, Ranson and Vounckx also argued that his relational biology needs to be modified to give 
a proper place to scalar hierarchies, arguing that they were not properly dealt with by Rosen. This 
criticism reinforces Pattee’s criticism of Rosen’s later work, suggesting that after writing Anticipatory 
Systems Rosen had abandoned the ideas on which they had worked together for a more mathematical and 
more ‘idealist’ approach, in contrast to his own physicalist and ‘materialist’ approach (Pattee, 2007). In 
fact Rosen did describe physical existence involving different levels of organization associated with 
constraints years after the publication of Anticipatory Systems and while he was working on Life Itself 
(Rosen, 1988). The difference between Rosen and Pattee was that Rosen broke more fundamentally with 
classical physics and the privileged place it accorded universal, inexorable, physical laws. That is, through 
his work on modeling and the problem of modeling Aristotle’s four causes, Rosen moved closer to the 
tradition of Schellingian and Peircian ontology. As Louie pointed out, Rosen’s defence of Aristotle’s four 
causes involved developing a notion of immanent causation (Louie, 2008). It was Schellingian rather than 
Aristotelian, and from this perspective, Rosen saw apparently inexorable physical laws not as the 
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reference point for all science as Pattee has continued to do, but as localized and in need of explanation. 
The problem is that he did not discuss hierarchies based on non-holonomic constraints and M-R systems 
at the same time. That he did not forget his work on hierarchy is evident in his appreciation of the 
complexity of time. His daughter Judith Rosen and John Jay Kineman pointed out that Robert Rosen saw 
time as a relational concept, and so as complex, involving multiple time-scales (Rosen and Kineman, 
2005). Measurement of time must be utterly context-dependent, and this is also the case with the 
modeling of temporal processes by organisms when they anticipate the future, as when trees anticipate 
cold weather on the basis of changing length of days and shed their leaves before temperatures drop 
below freezing. Judith Rosen further conveyed the central place her father accorded temporality in her 
introduction to the new edition of Anticipatory Systems published in 2012: ‘Living organisms have the 
equivalent of one “foot” in the past, the other in the future, and the whole system hovers, moment by 
moment, in the present – always on the move, through time. The truth is that the future represents as 
powerful a causal force on current behaviour as the past does, for all living things’ (J. Rosen, 2012, xi). 
Nevertheless, by giving a place to scalar hierarchies, Cottam et.al. have provided the means to better 
integrate Rosen’s concern with hierarchy and his work on anticipatory systems.  
Stanley Salthe’s work on hierarchy theory further clarifies this relationship. Salthe attempted to 
integrate hierarchy theory and Peircian semiotics along with other work, including Rosen’s ideas, tracing 
out a general theory of development and evolution. Part of the problem with the view of emergence 
through constraints is that it assumes that fractionated components exist self-sufficiently and are 
somehow constrained to form part of the emergent system. This is associated with a tendency to see 
emergent entities as supervening over smaller entities, ignoring the environment in which these entities 
were able to exist in the first place, and then the new environment created by the emergent system. Salthe 
corrected this view, pointing out that emergence, in both evolution and development, is associated with 
interpolation between processes of shorter and longer scales and faster and slower rate processes, 
modifying both the longer and the shorter scale processes (1985, 145; 1993, ch.2; 2012). Granting a place 
to scalar hierarchies also helps clarify the nature of final causes. As Salthe observed: ‘constraints from the 
higher level not only help to select the lower level-trajectory but also pull it into its future at the same 
time. Top-down causality is a form of final causality’ (1993, 270). The essential temporality and process 
nature of anticipation has been also clarified by Nadin (2012). 
 An idea of what the mathematical integration of Rosen’s work on anticipatory systems and 
hierarchy theory would look like can be gained from Louie’s further development of Rosen’s ideas (Louie 
and Poli, 2011) and also from the work of Eherensmann and Vanbremeersh on memory evolutive 
systems, a mathematical theory deploying Category Theory and influenced by the work of Rashevsky and 
Rosen. This has been further developed by integrating other mathematical ideas, including Baas’ work on 
hyperstructures, which explain emergence, and Simeonov’s work on Wandering Logic Intelligence 
(Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch, 1987 & 2007; Baas, Eherensmann and Vanbremeersch, 2004; 
Eherensmann and Simeonov, 2012). The outcome is a rich mathematical framework that is able to relate 
memory and anticipation, levels and time scales, interaction and complexity, and emergence. Its authors 
have specifically related memory evolutive systems to Rosen’s model of organisms, showing their 
consistency while at the same time identifying the condition for the emergence of objects and systems of 
increasing complexity during the course of evolution (Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch, 2006).  
Interpreting Rosen’s work as a development of the tradition that goes back to Schelling, 
integrating hierarchy theory with the notion of anticipatory systems both strengthens Rosen’s work as a 
means to justify other anti-reductionist ideas in biology, while at the same time allowing Rosen’s work to 
28 
 
be augmented by these other traditions. His work can be used to defend the work of the biosemioticians, 
which in turn could be used to further augment Rosen’s research program. Eliseo Fernández, for instance, 
has shown how the insights of Peirce and Rosen illuminate each other, clarifying the presupposition about 
temporality in Peirce’s characterization of semiosis while at the same time further clarifying Rosen’s 
notion of self-referential anticipatory systems and the place temporality has to play in these (Fernández, 
2008; Fernández, 2010; Goudsmit, 2009). As she points out, the relations associated with self-reference 
and with semiosis are essentially durational, and as such, tend to be obscured by static diagrams. As she 
put it, ‘A sign does not exist at any singular, particular instant, just as motion does not exist 
instantaneously. Like motion, semiosis is radically temporal, in the sense that its parts cannot coexist in 
the way that spatially individuated objects do’ (Fernández, 2010, 154). It is by virtue of this that the 
interpretant, besides representing the object, is able to represent the very relation of representation which 
the sign has to that object. Ricardo Gudwin and João Queiroz have attempted to provide a mathematical 
model of Peircian semiosis that they call ‘Mathematical Semiosis’ using Rosen’s ideas on anticipatory 
systems to achieve this (Gudwin and Queiroz, 2007).  
However, this is hardly an end to the matter. Barbieri’s argument that codes originated in life 
before any interpretation, which emerged later, highlights the need to investigate further the interpretative 
(semantic) component of interpretants. It is here that the work of Waddington, Goodwin, Thom, Piaget, 
von Foerster and Rocha can be drawn upon and used to support biosemiotics further. Integrating these 
concepts with the notion of anticipatory systems not only offers new directions for research but 
strengthens the claims of these theoretical concepts; the implicit assumption of teleology built into such 
notions as ‘homeorhesis’ and ‘attractor’ can be more robustly defended. When situated within this 
framework, it is possible to accept Barbieri’s account of codes without interpretation, which if it is to be 
taken seriously as a mechanistic explanation must assume the validity of final causes that mechanisms 
serve, as part of a post-Newtonian ontology. Similarly, the concepts of mainstream complexity theorists 
(which Rosen saw as dealing only with ‘complication’) can be reinterpreted as part of a post-Newtonian 
ontology and biology, as Brian Goodwin argued, rather than being seen as another triumph of reductionist 
thought as Per Bak saw it. Anticipatory systems set the boundary conditions for fields in which patterns 
can emerge (at the edge of chaos) from large numbers of interacting components and be identified as 
patterns and responded to as such, rather than being seen as epiphenomena. Finally, structures like the 
self-regulating systems of transformations described by Piaget and those he influenced, which relate 
codes to the constructive, interpretative, pragmatic and semantic component of intepretants, can be 
recognized as a feature of at least multi-cellular life (Piaget, 1970, 3ff.; Rocha, 1996).  
This integration of ideas through a tradition of post-mechanistic ontology provides the basis for a 
reassessment of and for charting new directions in physics. Von Neumann’s suggestion that statistical 
concepts should be taken as original and that probability has priority over deterministic equations can be 
integrated into this synthesis. As Peirce argued, apparently law governed behaviour should be seen as 
emerging from a more primordial realm of chaos (which emerges from a state of absolute nothingness). 
Through chance, habits develop that reinforce themselves, generating entities with definite propensities 
and lawfulness in their behavior. These provide the conditions for semiosis. The deterministic models 
presenting nature as law governed are applicable to highly unusual situations, usually created artificially 
to eliminate random interactions. Like the measurements associated with such models, they should be 
appreciated as abstractions from a broader reality. This is how Schelling characterized Newtonian physics 
and it accords with Rosen’s insights based on his study of modeling. While Rosen did not engage with the 
biosemioticians as did Pattee, his project of developing an ontology not only supports Pattee’s 
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contribution to this tradition in defending and explaining digital signs (symbols) and their role in 
organisms but justifies Hoffmeyer’s complaint against Pattee that he still leaves us with a dualism in that 
we cannot describe the semiotic aspect of the world in the same language we use to describe its dynamic 
aspects (Hoffmeyer, 2008, 94). Rosen’s ontology would have provided this unifying language and 
thereby also justify the role accorded by Hoffmeyer and Emmeche to analogue codes.  
Brian Josephson has made a similar argument against the privileging of deterministic dynamical 
models of physics in developing Everett - Wheeler’s suggestion for interpreting quantum physics. They 
argued that physical laws describable through equations emerge via the observer. Embracing Peirce’s 
semiotics, Josephson argues that the gap between observer participancy and physical reality can be filled 
in by biosystems. Biology, Josephson argues, is primarily concerned with patterns and only secondarily 
with quantities; through the operation of signs, these patterns are forward looking. It is this capacity for 
anticipation that makes possible the kinds of observations that construct systems as law-governed 
(Josephson, 2012, 246). This delimits the domain of validity of what can be understood through an 
algorithm that from input data can determine which of the possibilities pre-stated in configuration space 
will be realized. Josephson’s radical interpretation of quantum theory leaves room for the emergence of 
the unpredictable and incalculable novelty that clearly has occurred in the evolution of the biosphere. This 
not only breaks with Newton’s physics, but also Einstein’s physics and Bohr’s physics, for as Stuart 
Kauffman pointed out, each of these prestates a configuration space (Kauffman, 2000, 123). This 
condition has hitherto (save for those influenced by Peirce or Whitehead) been taken as the defining 
feature of successful science. Such a suggestion coming from a leading theoretical physicist supports 
Rosen’s contention that in any conflict with the discourse of biology it is the discourse of physics that 
should give way, and that the development of biology is the key to advancing physics.  
 
8. Conclusion: Creating a New Mathematics 
 
From what has been achieved in the past, we should get some idea of what research is likely to 
prove successful in the future. We can see that over the last two hundred years it has been the quest to 
develop a conception of being in terms of which the existence of life is intelligible and then developing 
the requisite mathematics that has been one of the most important driving forces, not only for biology, but 
also for mathematics and physics. This is likely to prove true in the future. As it was argued in 1975 by 
René Thom, it could again be argued that the stagnation in physics, recently complained about by Lee 
Smolin (Smolin, 2006), can be traced back to mainstream biology. The latter, dominated by the 
unimaginative tried and true methods and mathematics of reductionism, has largely abandoned the quest 
to make life itself intelligible. The consequent drying up of new insights into physical reality has crippled 
science as a whole. More importantly, since it is through what is understood of the world through science 
that societies model themselves and their relation to their environments and anticipate their future, this 
failure of science, foisting defective models of reality on whole societies, now threatens their very 
existence.   
We can see a pattern in the history of biology and mathematics where theory inspired by and then 
guiding empirical work, work that aimed to characterize and comprehend life, stimulated efforts to 
develop mathematics adequate to the task, identifying, questioning and then transcending assumptions 
that had made life and mind unintelligible. This led to efforts to develop mathematics that went beyond 
describing motion from an external perspective and, instead of presupposing forms, could provide the 
means to model the processes of self-formation in nature. While this began with crystals, the aim was to 
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develop mathematics able to deal with the much more complex processes of the self-formation of life. 
Since rejecting the externalist perspective meant seeing the development of human cognition as part of 
this self-formation of nature, particular attention was paid to the relationship between the development of 
mathematical concepts and the generation of forms in nature. The most basic mathematical concepts 
corresponded to virtually no order, while study of more specific concepts could make life intelligible and 
later, even the development of cognition. Inspired by this project, mathematics has advanced in two 
complementary directions. Firstly, there has been a push for greater abstraction to identify what is most 
basically essential in mathematical thought, thereby overthrowing often unconscious restrictive 
assumptions that limited the range of what was deemed comprehensible through mathematics. The second 
direction, correlated with the first, has been to examine the various conditions that are then conceivable, 
when mathematics is freed from the assumptions of particular conditions associated with classical 
physics.  
The work of Hermann Grassmann illustrates the advance in two complementary directions. His 
constructivism amounted to ‘the refusal to admit a domain of elements given prior to, or independently 
from the generation of the elements themselves … [It] is founded on the distinction between formal 
sciences – where no constraint on the domain is taken for granted, and the forms are one and the same 
with their construction – and real sciences, where some constraints are accepted from the outset, and 
forms are thus “embodied” in a fixed domain. … [A] general notion is particularized when further 
conditions are fixed, as in the case of the regressive product which is less general, if considered as relative 
to a unique domain’ (Cantú, 100). His ‘extension theory’, essentially a universal geometric algebra and 
calculus, could accommodate the mathematics of Newtonian physics but opened up new possibilities, and 
was of such generality that it still provides a coordinating framework for and insights into modern 
physics. Implicitly, it accommodates and supports an ontology in which space is not assumed but can be 
seen as emergent so that it becomes possible to think about the origin and self-formation of the cosmos. 
Quaternions are just one example of mathematical ideas that could be interpreted through Grassmann’s 
mathematics. As Clifford showed, extension theory provides insight into the special conditions associated 
with quaternions, but also suggests what other conditions might be possible and thereby what other 
features of reality might be modeled. The introduction of discontinuous signals and their derivatives by 
Heaviside, and then by Dirac in developing his formalism for quantum electro-dynamics, is another.  Less 
directly, Grassmann’s notion of multidimensional space also facilitated the development of phase space in 
which 3n-dimensional models of change gave insight into the nature of stability, instability, bifurcations, 
catastrophes, chaos and creativity at the edge of chaos. More broadly, William Lawvere, one of the major 
figures involved in the development of Category Theory, has argued that Grassmann’s work was a 
precursor to this theory (Lawvere, 256). The two complementary directions in the development of 
mathematics are also evident in work unrelated or only tenuously related to Grassmann. Leaving aside the 
development of set theory and group theory, Hertz’s introduction of and distinction between the notions 
of holonomic and nonholonomic constraints opened the way for the exploration by Pattee of non-
holonomic constraints, clarifying the nature of symbols and what is involved in measurement and 
hierarchical control.  
More recently, the development of Category Theory, focusing on and identifying common 
mathematical structures and clarifying the nature of modeling, has made it possible to study not only 
mathematical modeling of nature but modeling in nature by living systems. As Leo Corry pointed out, it 
was the development of the structural approach that gave a new impetus to Whitehead’s effort, largely 
inspired by Grassmann, to develop a Universal Algebra. As Corry noted, ‘it was not until the 
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consolidation of the structural approach to algebra that a broader interest in such an undertaking became 
manifest’ (Corry, 279).This has revealed new kinds of order that were not recognized or ruled out of 
bounds by earlier mathematicians, and thereby revealed new possibilities. Rosen’s embracing of 
impredicativities is the most important achievement here, allowing mathematics to focus on relations to 
relations associated with reflexivity. As Rosen showed, these are required to model final causes, functions 
and anticipatory systems and therefore life itself. This in turn has provided further insight into semiosis as 
it was characterized by Peirce. 
While advances in theory and mathematics are often made through efforts to clarify ideas, 
overcome incoherencies or reconcile different ideas in received work, the lesson from this history is that 
advances are most likely to be made when such efforts are combined with empirical research. If the work 
of different streams within the post-reductionist tradition of science are to be integrated and further 
developed, rather than being examined in relation to each other, the most promising path might be to look 
at living processes again and only through this try to develop such an integrated perspective. The central 
aim of the tradition of biological and mathematical thought originating in the work of Schelling is to 
comprehend nature as self-organizing and self-constructing. To bring this back into focus, one possible 
area of research that illustrates what could be done is the actual processes of organisms responding to 
their environments. There is much work in cognitive science now being reinterpreted in the broader 
framework of theoretical biology encompassing neuroscience examining such processes. Valuable and 
insightful as this work has been, it could also pay to examine areas where because of spatial and temporal 
scale and process rates it is easier to investigate. For such reasons Robert Ulanowicz defended ecology as 
the privileged domain and ultimate reference point for defining science (Ulanowicz, 1997, 6).  However, 
given recent theoretical advances and empirical work in vegetative semiosis as described above, it is this 
kind of work that could prove a useful focus for reflection on what new directions mathematics could now 
take.  
Günther Witzany’s description of semiosis in plants indicates its complexity. Although Witzany 
conceived this semiosis as communication, his work has been interpreted as a development of 
biosemiotics and can be considered in relation to other work in the post-reductionist tradition. Although it 
focuses on plants, vegetative semiosis is common to plants, animals and humans and presupposes the 
semiosis of cells. Just as semiosis enables seedlings to discover new forms, so also with embryos. Rosen 
has justified the assumption by biosemioticians of final causes and the view that semiosis involves 
responding on the basis of models that organisms, including plants, have of themselves in their 
environments, that remember the past and anticipate the future. What Witzany is describing is how such 
models are achieved and the responses based upon them. Their achievement involves endosemiotics of 
considerable complexity, while responses involve specific kinds of growth or morphogenesis which 
involves at the same time niche creation. As such, growth is clearly constrained by what nutrients are 
accessible and what structures are physically possible, but is further constrained by the growing 
organism’s assessment of its situation and of the best responses to make and by the dynamics of and 
semiosis within the ecosystem in which it is participating. Such assessments are complex because, for 
their achievement, different parts of the organism have to interpret and interact with each other and the 
future of both the plant and what is in its environment have to be anticipated. Clearly, this is an exemplary 
case of self-formation in nature, and comprehending this semiosis is precisely the knowledge from the 
inside called for by Schelling and his followers. Witzany referred to plants assessing their surroundings, 
making estimates, and achieving the optimum variant. Vegetative semiosis is really computing, although 
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recognizing it as such expands the meaning of computing, and doing so could expand the meaning of 
mathematics. 
As Pattee pointed out, there are different ways of understanding computing. The formal approach 
identifies computing with the manipulation of symbols and tends to presuppose the model of a Turing 
machine, even when hypothesizing that the whole of nature consists of such computing. This is merely 
the latest advance of the Newtonian view of the world. However, there is another way of understanding 
computing, ‘computing in the wild’, that treats such symbolic manipulation as a special case that ignores 
analogue computing which is iconic and indexical, the relationship between these two forms of 
computing, which might or might not be synchronous, and reflexivity in this computing (Pattee, 1995; 
MacLennan, 2004). Usually, those examining computing in the wild do not see it as a universal feature of 
nature but as a defining feature of life. In fact it is coming to be recognized that living is among other 
things computing in this sense, an insight eloquently captured by the title of Denis Bray’s book, Wetware. 
There are a number of areas that have been identified where computing in the wild can be investigated: 
‘self-assembly, developmental processes, biochemical reactions, brain processes, bionetworks and 
cellular processes’ (Dodig-Crnkovic, 2012). With the exception of brain processes, all of these are 
involved in vegetative semiosis as it was described by biosemioticians. The challenge is to comprehend 
this computing in the wild in all its complexity, avoiding the tendency to create a surrogate reality for life 
itself, then projecting one-sided models onto what is being studied – thus, merely reproducing what we 
already know from what has been learnt in the past about fractionated components of life.  
In this regard it is necessary to ensure that terms that have ambivalent meanings are understood 
from a post-reductionist perspective and not a Newtonian perspective. For instance, one of the most 
problematic terms in biology is ‘information’. Originally, inform meant to in-form, that is, to take in and 
be formed. The suffix ‘–ation’ implies a noun of process, so ‘information’ originally meant to ‘the process 
by which a form is being taken in and forming’ someone. The notion of information as it was 
characterized by Shannon and Weaver has virtually none of this meaning, being defined in accordance 
with Newtonian thought (Brier, 2008). Gregory Bateson redefined information as ‘a difference which 
makes a difference’, able to make a difference because there are ‘pathways ready to be triggered’ 
(Bateson, 1972, 453). In this way it could be and was related it to living processes. Robert Rosen went 
even further in this direction, characterizing information as ‘anything which is or can be an answer to a 
question’ (1986, 174; 2012, 373), thereby highlighting the active nature of the response of an organism to 
the differences which makes a difference. We could heed Brian Josephson’s Peircian argument that 
systems understandable through deterministic equations can only be properly understood in relation to 
living patterns characterized by semiosis. This would avoid the tendency to treat information 
reductionistically. The problem for mathematics is then to model this semiosis or computing in the wild in 
a way that does full justice to its holistic features.  
Through the different strands of post-reductionist science such problems are being recognized, 
and efforts are being made to develop new forms of thinking and rethink the nature of both computing 
and mathematics accordingly. A boost to this whole program is coming from work in computer science, 
artificial intelligence and robotics where Newtonian assumptions have limited progress, despite the 
obvious significance of such research. Such limited progress has turned attention back to analogue 
computing and its potential and to quantum computing, and it is now recognized that specific forms of 
computing are best carried out in the medium being investigated. For instance, it has been shown that a 
combination of analogue computers and neural nets can identify the prime numbers in large numbers far 
faster than digital computers, and it has been proved by Leonard Adelman that a difficult Hamilton Path 
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Problem could be solved using DNA computing in a week where it would take hundreds of years using 
the best algorithms and digital computers (Adelman, 1994; Nadin, 2010, 1). The promise of such work 
has led to alliances between theoretical scientists, mathematicians and researchers engaged in these more 
practical fields. The kind of work under way is illustrated by those involved in the integral biomathics 
project (Simeonov, 2010; Simeonov et.al., 2012). This is essentially revolutionary science, breaking with 
entrenched assumptions, and this highlights the further significance of their work. 
Research in revolutionary science is more creative and thereby more unpredictable than normal 
science. It is less easy to manage. However, management science dominated by Newtonian thinking is 
now penetrating universities and research institutions previously wedded to the (Schelling-influenced) 
Humboldtian idea of the university and of research. (Gare, 2011, 27). Its proponents are foisting upon 
these institutions a defective model of their own identity, claiming thereby to be able to anticipate and 
improve their efficiency in the production of outputs for given inputs. However, there is no algorithm for 
generating creative thought or predicting it, and to attempt to quantitatively measure the quality of such 
thought is a category mistake. With their assumption that research can be predicted and efficiently 
controlled, managers influenced by such doctrines are hostile to revolutionary science and those who 
engage in it, despite work in the history of science showing that efforts to manage science in this way 
always destroy it (Ben-David 1971). The advance of Schellingian science and the incorporation of this in 
institutions and technology is required to free science from such ways of thinking, but this managerialism 
is by its very nature hostile to revolutionary anti-reductionist science. We are still grappling with the 
situation that Thom characterized in 1975 where, in the face of global environmental problems ‘science 
[had sunk] into a futile hope of exhaustively describing reality, while forbidding itself to “understand” it’ 
(Aubin, 2004, 95). We must hope that this revived quest to overcome the Newtonian paradigm will be 
more successful.  
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